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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the multifaceted problem of the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) with a view to suggesting viable options to integrate tribal 
areas of Pakistan into the national mainstream and a role that can be played by 
information operations (IO) in achieving this integration. The paper discusses 
historical background and provides an overview of administrative, judicial, 
political, and socioeconomic aspects of issues and addresses impact of military 
operations within the area. The launching of military operations in the FATA after 
9/11 became a necessity; their impact is discussed at length to determine 
remedies and applications of strategies and tools to achieve the smooth 
integration of the FATA into the national mainstream. In assessing underlying 
causes, this study suggests that a significant change to the status quo is 
essential and effective measures must be taken to initiate tribal area integration 
to safeguard wider national and international interests. The role of IO, i.e., non-
kinetic, non-lethal options, to include application of tools and capabilities is 
analysed with respect to achieving FATA integration into the national 
mainstream. This research is focused on a more cohesive strategy of integration 
and future vision of integrating the FATA into the national mainstream by 
applying modern IO tools. 
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The “Federally Administrated Tribal Areas” (FATA) is a territory that, according to 
the constitution of Pakistan, belongs to Pakistan, but enjoys a special status 
within the country. It is a hilly and far-flung territory alongside the Durand Line, 
now the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Figure 1). It 
occupies an area that is approximately the size of Belgium and stretches 450 
kilometers along the border with Afghanistan. According to the national census, it 
has a population of 5.7 million people on the Pakistani side of the border, as 
compared to the overall population of Pakistan, which is 187.34 million (per July 
2011 estimates). The cutting into two parts of a territory belonging to one and the 
same tribe was among the reasons that this line, since its creation by the colonial 
powers, has caused so much trouble and been a bone of contention, especially 
after creation of the state of Pakistan.  
The FATA consists of seven agencies (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, 
Orakzai, Kurram, and North and South Waziristan) and six frontier regions (FR 
Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR Bannu, FR Lakki, FR Tank, and FR D.I. Khan). These 
agencies/regions have a semiautonomous status and are administered through a 
special law, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901. The British colonial 
rulers who were responsible for the establishment of this law and the special 
status attached to the area had their own imperial considerations and aims in 
designing and keeping it like this. Unfortunately, Pakistan, after gaining 
independence, chose to carry on the imperial policies and thereby denied the 
status of full rights and citizenship to the people of the FATA. This is even more 
deplorable because Quaid–e–Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the founding father 
of Pakistan) had ordered the ending of the “forward policy” devised by the British. 
This led to the voluntary declaration of loyalty to Pakistan by the tribes, which 
had earlier refused to accept British suzerainty. Disregarding the quaid’s order, 
successive Pakistani governments since 1947 never altered their conduct and 
did not take the initiative to develop an alternative policy for the region. 
 xx 
FATA inhabitants have no fundamental rights as enjoyed by the rest of the 
people of Pakistan. In the past, no significant change in the socioeconomic 
structure of tribal areas could be brought about. The lack of job opportunities has 
turned this region into a smugglers' paradise. Drug trafficking and gunrunning 
have become the main occupation of many inhabitants of the region. The FATA 
is also a sanctuary for kidnapers, car thieves, and other criminal elements. 
Government efforts to bring the tribal areas within the folds of the normal law of 
the land have achieved poor results. The tribal culture and customs have strongly 
resisted any change in the system. Today, the tribal areas need major 
governmental attention through revolutionary reforms in social, economic, 
cultural, judicial, political, and related fields. The fruit of modern and 
representative administration needs to be extended to the population in these 
areas. 
The attack of 9/11 and subsequent events have thrust the tribal regions 
into the international limelight. In order to address domestic as well as 
international concerns, the military has launched operations in specific areas of 
the tribal belt to flush out foreign terrorists and outlaws. Security imperatives 
demand a quick and early improvement in the situation and a lasting solution to 
the FATA conundrum. 
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The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is a vast tract 
of land that lies along the sensitive Pakistani–Afghan (Pak–Afghan) border and 
accounts for 27,220 square kilometres, or 3.4 percent of Pakistan's land area. 
Under the 1973 constitution, the FATA is separate from the province within which it 
lies, and although the constitution decrees that “the state shall discourage 
parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices among the citizens,”1 it 
later allows for the operation of a distinct and different set of laws to operate within 
these areas. Figure 1 shows a map of the FATA. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Map of the FATA 
                                            
1 Syed Raza, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 (GF Printing Press, 
1973), 73. 
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Since the creation of Pakistan, the tribal areas continue to maintain a 
special political and administrative status within the country. Under this special 
status, the area is governed arbitrarily through the Frontier Crimes Regulations 
(FCR) Act of 1901. Government efforts to bring the tribal areas within the folds of 
the normal laws of the land have achieved some results, but tribal culture and 
customs have strongly resisted any significant change in the system. Today, the 
tribal areas require major governmental attention through revolutionary reforms in 
education, the judiciary, and health and communication facilities. In addition, the 
fruits of modern and representative administration need to be extended to the 
population of the region. 
The attacks on the United States on 9/11 and subsequent events have 
thrust the tribal regions into the international limelight. To address domestic as 
well as international concerns, military operations in specific areas of the tribal 
belt were launched to flush out foreign terrorists and outlaws. However, a 
segment of tribal society, i.e., a small percentage of the population who are 
either religiously misled or have criminal connections with local and 
international players in the region, has a stake in continuing to exploit the 
government and people of the FATA. These elements continue to be a hindrance to 
establishing law and order by government security agencies. They also garner 
support from countries hostile to Pakistan. 
The status of the FATA and its proximity to the Pak–Afghan border poses 
a unique challenge to Pakistan on a number of levels. Historically an arena for 
imperial competition and possible invasion route, the area has since been used 
as a launch point and conduit for the exercise of influence in Afghanistan. It has 
more recently emerged as a source of terrorist and criminal activity that threatens 
Pakistan’s national security. The region also has geopolitical and growing 
economic significance, in that it is a potential route for the economic development 
of the emerging Central Asian states. On the ideological level, the continued 
semiautonomous status of the region poses a direct challenge to the integrity of 
Pakistan as a nation-state, and through militancy threatens the government’s 
 3 
efforts towards economic and social development. Thus, there is a requirement 
to fully integrate these strategically important but neglected areas into the 
national mainstream, while addressing the problems prevalent there. To cogently 
address this problem, this thesis has been divided into the following chapters. 
• Chapter I provides an introduction to the thesis and its contents. 
• Chapter II explains the geography, historical background and 
rediscovered importance of the FATA. 
• Chapter III discusses existing administrative, judicial and political 
systems of the tribal areas and their impact on socioeconomic 
conditions in the area.  
• Chapter IV analyzes security implications in relation to ongoing 
military operations. 
• Chapter V presents overall analysis and draws conclusions.  
• Chapter VI focuses on the feasibility of applying information-
operations tools for smooth integration of the FATA into the national 
mainstream.  
• Chapter VII offers measures and recommendations. 
 
 4 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 5 
II. GEOPOLITICAL SETTING 
The spectacular land in which the Pathans live has had a major 
effect on their history and their way of life.2 
— J.W. Spain 
A. GEOGRAPHICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS 
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan lies to the 
northwest of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and borders Afghanistan. 
It is a narrow tract of land 1200 km in length and 130 km at its widest point. 
Geographically, the tribal area lies on the apex of three of the highest mountain 
ranges in the world: the Hindu Kush, Pamir and the Karakoram ranges3. 
Administratively, the FATA is divided into seven political agencies: Khyber, 
Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan, and 
into six frontier regions: Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, D I Khan and 
Tank4 (see appendixes A, B and C). The FATA is inhabited by various Pashtun 
tribes who follow the ancient code of Pukhtunwali in their day-to-day affairs (see 
appendixes B and D). The tribal psyche hinges on sensitivities based on tribal 
traditions, or riwaj, and religious sentiments, which are often intermingled in a 
complex manner. 
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The tribal form of society has persisted in a landscape that lay across the 
passage of countless invaders, including Alexander (356 BC. 310 BC), Genghis 
Khan (1162–1227) and Tamerlane (1336–1405).5 The people of the FATA have 
                                            
2 James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), 21. 
3 David Ditchers, The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1967), 2. 
4 Mumtaz Ali, “The Political and Administrative Development of Tribal Areas” (Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Peshawar: Area Study Centre Central Asia, 1996), 3. 
5 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957 (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1958), xxi. 
 6 
defended their homeland against all sorts of adventures6 and misadventures and 
have remained fiercely independent.7 Except for Aurangzeb, all other rulers of 
the Mughal dynasty followed a policy of conciliation, desisting from all direct and 
indirect interference in the internal affairs of the area.8  
Consequent to the annexation of the Punjab and present-day North-West 
Frontier Province in 1849, the British slowly gained access within the FATA. The 
northwest-frontier tribal belt presented a difficult problem for the British, i.e., with 
regard to how to prevent the tribesmen from plundering British territory and how 
to defend India against any possible Russian aggression9. With this in mind, the 
British tried different methods to administer the area. A “closed-door policy” of 
non-interference in the affairs of the area10 gave way to the “forward policy” of 
direct administration of the area on or about 1876.11 The international boundary 
between British India and Afghanistan, earlier known as the Durand Line, was 
demarcated in 1893. During British rule, the socioeconomic conditions within the 
FATA remained stagnant.12 The Durand Line agreement’s broad contours are 
reflected in Appendix E for better comprehension of the overall environment. 
With the independence of Pakistan, tribesmen as a whole expressed their 
popular will to join the new nation.13 The tribes were assured of a continuation of 
agreements14 between the tribes and the British government by Quaid-e-Azam 
                                            
6 Imperial Gazetteer of India, North-West Frontier Province (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 
Publications, 1979), 13-15. 
7 Caroe, Pathans, xxii. 
8 Badshah Gul Wazir and Jehangir Khan Mohamand, Futuristics of Tribal Administration 
(Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1995). 
9 IPRI Islamabad, Paper, March 10, 2005. 
10 Lal Baha, N.W.F.P, Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919 (Islamabad: National 
Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), 5. 
11 Caroe, Pathans, 370. 
12 Akbar S. Ahmed, Religion and Politics in Muslim Society (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1987), 
15. 
13 Mehrunnisa Ali, Pak-Afghan Discord: A Historical Perspective 1855-1979 (University of 
Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, Universiy of Karachi, 1990), 114. 
14 Government of Pakistan, Revised Agreement with the Tribal People (Peshawar, 1947), 70. 
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Muhammad Ali Jinnah15 (see Appendix F). However, there were no fundamental 
changes in administrative, judicial and political policies. After the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979, the FATA came into the limelight.16 The influx of Afghan 
refugees, spread of militant culture, continuing civil war in Afghanistan and rise of 
the Taliban did much to aggravate the situation.17 These factors led to an altered 
ethnic balance, weapons proliferation, an influx of narcotics, stoppage of 
development works, a worsened law-and-order situation18 and desanctification of 
the international border. Following the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, the 
tribal areas again came into focus as a large number of foreign militants found 
refuge there,19 necessitating a cleanup operation. Military operations and their 
aftermath have brought to the fore the lingering problems of the tribal areas. 
C. THE REDISCOVERED IMPORTANCE OF THE FATA 
The region has always been significant in a geopolitical and an economic 
sense. However, the present regional milieu has accorded a new importance to 
the FATA because of the ongoing war on terror. Moreover, the requirement to 
access the developing markets of the Central Asian states and Afghanistan by 
opening up new trade routes, exploiting natural resources, extending gas 
pipelines and pursuing the overall development of Pakistan itself have given an 
entirely new prominence to the FATA. In view of these developments and their 
effects, it has become increasingly important for Pakistan to integrate the FATA 
into the mainstream of Pakistani politics, administration and society. 
                                            
15 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsood ul Hasan Nuri, eds., Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 
Challenges and Response (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 30.  
16 Ali, “Political and Administrative,” 77. 
17 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan and Maqsood ul Hasan Nuri, 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 
2005), 42.  
 18 Ibid., 49. 
 19 Aslam Effendi, “Civilizing Waziristan,” The News, April 9, 2004, 7. 
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III. EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND POLITICAL 
SYSTEMS OF TRIBAL AREAS 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE FATA 
With the termination of the British Raj in India in 1947, Pakistan secured, 
through its political agents in the tribal agencies, an agreement with the tribal 
chiefs, or maliks. Included within the agreement was a commitment to maintain 
existing internal arrangements in the tribal areas.20 To provide a legal and 
constitutional cover to these agreements, the governor general of Pakistan 
issued a series of orders and notifications under which the tribal areas were 
declared part of Pakistan, effective on 15 August 1947. The first constitution of 
Pakistan came into force on 23 March 1956 and did not bring any change in the 
political and administrative organization of the tribal areas. The 1973 constitution 
of Pakistan created special provisions in articles 246 and 247 that gave special 
status to the tribal areas21. For details, see appendixes B and G. Because of 
these agreements and provisions, acts of the national and provincial assemblies 
and the judicial powers of the state are not automatically applicable to these 
areas22. 
B. PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 
The administrative and judicial systems in the tribal areas intermingle and 
hinge on the troika of the jirga system, the political agent (PA), and the FCR of 
1901. The ministry of state and frontier regions (SAFRON) in Islamabad is 
responsible for administrative affairs and development activities in the area. The 
governor of the NWFP, as an agent to the president and representing the federal 
                                            
20 Government of Pakistan, Revised Agreement with the Tribal People (Peshawar, 1947). 
21 The Constitution of Pakistan, As Amended up to 10th January, 1988, Compiled by Sheikh 
Ebrahim (Lahore: Pakistan Educational Press), 131-135. 
22 Humayun Khan, The Role of the Federal Government and the Political Agent, Tribal Areas 
of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 
105. 
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government, administers the tribal areas23 through the FATA secretariat. Figure 2 
presents the pattern of administration. 
 
 
Figure 2.   FATA Administration24 
1. Administrative and Judicial Institutions in the Tribal System 
a. Political Agents 
The political agent (PA) was an innovation of the British in India25. 
Today, the seven federally administered tribal agencies are administered by a 
political agent who combines administrative, judicial and diplomatic roles. He has 
at his disposal a whole array of benefits apart from the khasadars, or government 
local security employees, and frontier corps, or Civil Armed Forces personnel. An 
organizational outline of the political agent’s office is given below. 
                                            
23 Cheema, et. al., Federally Administered, 49. 
24 Muhammad Tayyab Ghafoor, “Impediments in the Integration of Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) in the National Mainstream of Pakistan,” December 2009, accessed on July 
16, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA512301. 
25 Khan, The Role of the Federal, 107. 
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Figure 3.   Political Agent Organization26 
b. The System of Maliks and Lungi Holders 
Each tribe has its traditional elders, known as maliks, who 
represent their tribe27. Lungis, or turbans, are awarded to some loyal and 
influential individuals for rendering services to the government. 28 There are a 
total of 3,616 maliks and 3,441 lungi holders in the FATA and frontier regions29. 
The maliks and lungis are influential within the populace of the FATA. 
c. The Jirga System and its Types 
The jirga is an assembly of tribal elders where disputes are taken 
for amicable settlement, and decisions are given on the basis of riwaj.30 Riwaj is 
synonymous to local cultural values. There are three main types of jirgas.31 The 
sarkari jirga is nominated by the political agent to settle intertribal disputes, the 
                                            
26 Ghafoor, “Impediments in the Integration.” 
27 Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, “Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Response,” 
address, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005. 
28 Adilla Rehman, Anwar Ali Shah, Shahid Bashir and Raja Muhammad Abbas, “Viability of 
Extending Fiscal Laws to the Tribal Laws,” (research paper, Lahore: National Institute of Public 
Administration 2004),  8. 
29 “Federally Administered Tribal Areas,” accessed on June 2, 2012, 
http://www.khyber_gateway.com, June 2012.  
30 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Circled in Controversy,” Newsline, August 2002.  
31 “Federally Administered.” 
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qaumi jirga is formed by the tribe itself to settle intratribal issues and the shakhsi 
jirga is formed at the request of and by the disputing individuals themselves. 
d. The FATA Secretariat 
The FATA secretariat was established in the year 2000. The 
secretariat concentrates all directorates of line departments, sections of power 
and development (P&D) and the finance department under one organization. The 
federal government, through SAFRON and the governor’s secretariat, makes 
allocation of funds utilized by the FATA secretariat for the agencies. 
2. Frontier Crime Regulations and the System of Law 
Enforcement in the FATA 
The political administration maintains law and order in the FATA through 
frontier-crimes regulations, which are enforced by the frontier corps and 
khasadars, and placed at the disposal of the PA32. The FCR of 190133 excludes 
the technicalities of the ordinary law 34 and recognizes modern principles 
governing the dispensation of justice35. Details of major problem areas in the 
FCR are reflected in appendix H. 
C. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE TRIBAL AREAS 
The politics of the FATA must be viewed as a complex interplay of tribal, 
economic, cultural, religious, and even criminal activity that no single index can 
accurately measure. Certainly such an attempt is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, some of the major features are described in the following paragraphs. 
                                            
32 Azmat Hayat Khan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and 
Response (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 95. 
33 Talat Sattar, “Frontier Crime Regulations: A Draconian Law Against Tribal People,” 
accessed on June 2, 2012, http://www.PakistanLink.com. 
34 Spain, Pathan Borderland, 29. 
35 Amir Mahmoud Khan, “Justice Denied,” Newsline, December 2004. 
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1. Political Parties 
Except for religious parties like Jamait i Islami and Jamiat i Ulemai Islam, 
who use the umbrella of religion to hold their meetings, other nonreligious and 
secular political parties are barred from undertaking political activities in the 
FATA since the introduction of the 1935 Indian Act36. The situation has not 
changed in the new millennium. Recently on 10 January 2005, the governor 
secretariat issued a notification that asked administrations to enforce a complete 
ban on political activities and barred NWFP ministers and MMA leaders from the 
tribal region. 
2. System of Representation 
The FATA used to have a restricted mode of franchise where only maliks 
and lungi holders could vote for candidates for the national assembly37. 
However, on 14 December 1996, the right of universal suffrage was granted to 
tribal members. At present, twelve members from the FATA represent their 
people in the national assembly, i.e., the lower house, whereas eight seats are 
reserved for FATA members in the senate, i.e., the upper house. 
3. Political Initiatives Taken by the Government 
Apart from the grant of universal adult franchise to tribals in 1996; i.e., to 
all upstanding citizens eighteen or older, except lunatics, aliens, bankrupts and 
criminals, without discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, caste or language; 
no major steps were taken to address the political situation in tribal areas before 
2001. Major political initiatives taken by the government after 2001 are given 
below. 
                                            
36 Nayar Zaman Momand, “The Tribal Question,” The Frontier Post, July 10, 1996. 
37 “Adult Franchise for FATA,” Dawn Karachi, February 11, 1994. 
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a. Political Reforms 
The present government constituted a FATA Reforms Committee 
(FRC) to consider some of the political options. The FRC recommended a 
number of measures, including implementation of a plan for devolution of power, 
amendments to the FCR and improvement in the security situation,38 all of which 
are being implemented. 
b. Devolution of Power 
Although the local-government plan of 2000 did not initially 
envisage application of the system to the FATA, the government decided to 
extend it to the tribal areas in January 200239. The major decisions taken by the 
government for the devolution of power for the FATA are reflected in Annex J40. 
D. OVERALL SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
Socioeconomic conditions play a significant role in shaping people’s 
minds. Deprivation of basic amenities has left people of these regions vulnerable 
to exploitation by anti-state elements. A thorough understanding of these 
conditions will help in formulating a comprehensive information-operation plan. 
FATA is declared as the least developed area of Pakistan,41 with one of the 
lowest per-capita incomes42. Some of the basic facts having a bearing on the 
socioeconomic situation are: 
                                            
38 U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Pakistan: Focus on Tribal Reforms,” 
accessed on September 25, 2011, http://www.irinnews.org. 
39 Mumtaz Ali Bangash, FATA Reforms Committee Revised Report on the Introduction of 
Local Government Plan 2000 in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Pakistan and 
Proposed FATA-Regulation 2001. 
40 Ansar Abbasi, “Tribal Areas to Get Devolution Plan,” The News, January 24, 2002. 
41 Rehmatullah Khan Wazir, “FATA has been ignored over the last five decades, 74th 
Advanced Course In Public Sector Management” (research paper, Karachi: National Institute of 
Public Administration, 2002), 8. 
42 Masud Idrees, “Changing Patterns of the Economy in Tribal Areas Adjoining North-West 
Frontier Province (Pakistan),” (Ph.D. thesis, Peshawar: University of Peshawar, Area Study 
Centre Central Asia, 1992), 125. 
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1. Population 
The total population of the FATA is 3.176 million, with an annual growth 
rate of 2.19%43. Government estimates show that as much as 60% of FATA 
households are below the poverty line44. 
2. Literacy Rate 
The region has a literacy rate of 17.4%, which is significantly lower than 
the national average of 45%.  
3. Existing Infrastructure 
Unfortunately, the tribal areas have always been ignored in regard to 
infrastructure45. The meager number of schools, healthcare facilities, 
communication infrastructure and allied services cannot support any major 
economic venture. Approximately 80% of the funds allocated for the FATA are 
consumed on non-developmental charges to maintain the bureaucracy46. 
4. Water and Irrigation 
Water for sustenance and irrigation is a major need. A mere 44% of the 
population has access to clean drinking water47. A brief overview of present 
socioeconomic conditions in the FATA is included in appendixes K, L, M, N 
and O. 
                                            
43 Population Census Organization, Census Report 1998 (Islamabad: Government of 
Pakistan). 
44 Donneth Walton, “Technical Assistance to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for preparing 
FATA Rural Development Project, Report by Asian Development Bank,” accessed on July 2, 
2012, http://www.adb.org/documents/TARs/PAK/tar_pak33268.pdf. 
45 Ibid., 46. 
46 Rashid A. Khan, “Command and Staff College Quetta,” lecture, August 15, 2005. 
47 Walton, “Technical Assistance,” 2. 
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E. MAJOR SOURCES OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THEIR POTENTIAL 
1. Agriculture 
Agriculture forms a sizeable portion of the economic activity in the area. 
Due to various factors, agricultural productivity is below the subsistence level. A 
low level of mechanization, communal ownership of land in the tribal system, 
insufficient irrigation48 and inadequate use of pesticides results in low yields per 
acre. Details of agriculture in the FATA are given at Annex P. 
2. Livestock 
Livestock is also of vital economic importance in the FATA. However, due 
to nonscientific methods of animal husbandry, desired outputs are not available. 
Details of livestock in the FATA are attached as Annex Q. 
3. Forests 
Some areas in the FATA have a large amount of timber and other forest 
resources. Deforestation, use of valuable timber as fuel and degradation of 
grazing lands has resulted in the loss of income opportunities49. 
4. Minerals 
The tribal areas possess vast deposits of numerous minerals. Inadequate 
geological surveys, poor security environments and tribal disputes over mineral-
rich lands has not allowed for mineral exploration and adequate exploitation. 
5. Trade 
Trade has been major source of economic activity in the area. However, 
due to smuggling and other illegal practices, trade opportunities have dwindled 
over the years. Most of the tribesmen consider smuggling a legitimate business 
                                            
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 3. 
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activity and call it their tijarat’50, i.e., business. However, the real beneficiaries 
are the big mafias who control the trade51. 
6. Overseas Employment 
Labor by FATA residents in the countries of the Gulf region is another 
source of livelihood and revenue for the FATA, through remittances of income 
back to the region. With increasing competition in overseas markets, this source 
of monetary remittances is also dwindling. 
F. EFFECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM ON THE 
SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TRIBAL AREAS 
The FATA comprises some of the least developed areas of Pakistan. 
What little has been provided for development has either been squandered or 
become a victim of the prevalent administrative and political system. Thus, the 
tribal areas today are mired in poverty, leading to social problems and criminal 
activities52. Of late, Taliban and Al Qaeda elements have exploited this situation 
to their advantage. 
One of the major reasons for the survival of Al Qaeda elements in 
South Waziristan Agency was their ability to pay huge sums of 
money to poor locals in return for provision of shelter. Therefore, it 
can be said that economic problems had a major role to play in the 
overall worsening of the security situation.53 
The integration of the FATA into the national mainstream is therefore 
possible only by taking cognizant measures to reduce poverty, promote human 
resource development and initiate reforms in the existing judicial, administrative, 
and political systems.54 
                                            
50 Naimutullah Khan, interview, Miranshah, North Waziristan, May 14, 2005. 
51 Ali, “Political and Administrative,” 176.  
52 Aziz Sarwar, “FATA Ills Are Rooted in Economic Dependence,” Frontier Post, August 24, 
1996. 
53 Hameed Khattak, interview by author, Wana, South Waziristan, May 13, 2005. 
54 Moinuddin Haider, “Internal Security of Pakistan, Staff Course 2005,” lecture, Command 
and Staff College Quetta, June 2, 2005. 
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IV. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS IN RELATION TO THE ONGOING 
MILITARY OPERATION 
A. BACKDROP TO MILITARY INTERVENTION 
The conduct of military operations in the FATA, officially known as 
Operation Almizan, represents a significant departure from the security policy 
that had been in place since 1947. The stimulus for the change can be found in 
the need for uprooting extremism and criminal activity in the area, apart from 
pressure brought to bear on Pakistan by the U.S. in order to support its 
operations in Afghanistan. The militant and extremist presence in the area dates 
back to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. During the civil war in 
Afghanistan, groups like the Taliban and Al Qaeda established their roots in the 
area by appealing to the religious zeal and cultural sensitivities of a significant 
portion of the tribal people. They established their bases and tried to intermingle 
with the locals. The main interest of these groups rested in use of these remote 
and relatively lawless areas as safe havens for their extremist movements. They 
were able to create internal-security problems for Pakistan while using the local 
population as virtual hostages and resisting all government ingress. In view of 
this, the government of Pakistan considered it prudent to cleanse the Pakistani 
soil of unwanted elements present in the FATA. Today, Pakistan has stationed 
nearly 70,000 troops in the area55. An additional 5,000 troops were deployed on 
the border in July of 2011, and 5,000 more troops were added before the Afghan 
parliamentary polls in September56. In a stretch of over 600 kilometers, the 
Pakistani army has established 664 posts to stop cross-border infiltration. 
B. EFFECTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 
The Initial phase of Operation Almizan unfolded synchronously with 
coalition-force operations in December 2001. When the Pakistani army initially 
                                            
55 IPRI Islamabad. 
56 Muhammad Safdar, The News, September 16, 2005. 
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entered the tribal areas, it was welcomed enthusiastically by the local populace. 
During this stage, due to the porous nature of the border and insufficient 
surveillance resources, a significant number of militants found refuge in the 
FATA, apart from previously existing elements in the area and started using 
these areas as bases for operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. The 
second phase of the operation started once the Pakistani army moved into the 
North and South Waziristan agencies to flush out militant bases. Initially, the 
operation proceeded smoothly, but this phase culminated in mid-March 2004 
when the frontier corps, the South Waziristan scouts, operation at Kalosha met 
stiff resistance57. This first operation of Al Mizan was played out on television 
screens all over Pakistan. Kalosha II generated certain popular perceptions and 
forced a change in strategy. The militants started a comprehensive resistance 
strategy based on guerrilla tactics of ambush, raids, sniping, assassination and 
the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). From 11 June 2004 to date, a 
three-pronged strategy has been followed by the government. The main facets of 
this strategy included sealing of the border and sanitization of the area, creation 
of a suitable political environment and increased impetus of development 
projects. Presently, the overall security situation in the area has improved 
considerably and the opposition’s freedom of action has been limited. 
The entry of the Pakistani army to flush out foreign militants from the 
FATA has acted as a catalyst for sociopolitical change in the tribal areas. Some 
of the major effects of military operations are listed below. 
1. Military/Security Impact 
Given the relatively recent nature of military operations and the lack of 
authentic published sources, it is difficult to gather reliable data on military 
success or other relevant information. However, as a result of interaction with the 
                                            
57 Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri, ed., Fact Files: Operation Against Terrorists in South Waziristan 
(Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 2. 
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locals by local operational commanders, it can be inferred that these operations 
have been able to effect a positive change in the security situation of the area 
while extending the writ of the government. 
2. Political Impact and Local Perceptions 
The impact of offensive military operations on the political environment of 
FATA is crucial. A return to normalcy and apparent popular participation in 
governmental development schemes can be used as a means of measuring 
political success. Resentment created in a segment of population against the 
army due to collateral damage can be considered the major negative effect58. 
The militants have been able to draw on the sympathies of a portion of the 
population by appealing to their sensitivities with regard to hospitality and 
religion. At the macro-political level, these operations have aroused conflicting 
sentiments, because of disagreement by religious political parties and 
opposition59. Most political parties do not favour military operations because of 
possible backlash by extremists and terrorists. Meanwhile, the local population is 
hostage to local miscreants because of traditional cultural themes, e.g., “to 
provide shelter, security and food to a guest or outsider is part of Pathan’s culture 
and social values.” 
3. Development Activities 
A major impact of the operation has been in the development works 
undertaken by the army, which have had a positive effect on socioeconomic 
conditions.60. It has also made possible the entry of civil line departments and 
NGOs into the area. Details of some of the development activities are attached 
as Annex R. 
 
                                            
58 H. Jacob, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), October 21, 2011. 
59 Behroz Khan, “Libyan hatched plot to kill Musharraf,” The News, March 16, 2004. 
60 Cheema, et. al., Federally Administered, 12. 
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4. Improved International Image of Pakistan  
Pakistani efforts towards the elimination of terrorists in the FATA have 
increased the regional and international prestige of Pakistan. Coalition forces are 
keenly interested in the Pakistani army’s operations in the FATA, as NATO 
leaders are of the view that the operation would have a positive impact on 
NATO’s own operations inside Afghanistan61. 
C.  SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR IO THEMES 
Military operations may also have long-term security implications for 
Pakistan as a whole. If the overall government strategy is unable to isolate and 
control the problems within the FATA, they may translate into a protracted, low-
intensity conflict for the country as a whole, and maybe even for the region. 
Military operations in the FATA can have the following security implications for 
Pakistan: 
1. Increased Separatist Tendencies  
Bruised egos, violated codes of honor, a resurgent Taliban, remnants of Al 
Qaeda, Pushtun fraternity in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the shared hatred for 
the US in the region can, in combination, increase the demands of separatism 
and elements of extremism in the region.  
2. Effects on National and Army Morale  
Domestically, an increased number of army casualties in the FATA will be 
an embarrassment to the government and military. The effects of continued 
casualties may also create morale problems directly for the troops.  
                                            
61 “Military Operations in FATA,” accessed on October 21, 2011, 
http://www.pakdef.info/forum/showthread.php?t=5266. 
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3. Terrorist Acts in the Country 
The ongoing operations may have the effect of inducing increased acts of 
violence by the terrorists with the help of collaborators and sympathisers within 
the country. 
 24 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Having described the overall political, administrative, socioeconomic and 
security environments, it is prudent to analyze the impact of these environments 
on the integration of the FATA into the national mainstream. In short, integration 
would mean administrative, political, ideological and socioeconomic integration 
with the rest of the country. Problem areas in these sectors and possible means 
of integration are analyzed in the succeeding paragraphs. 
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND POLITICAL SYSTEM 
1. Administrative System 
The major problem areas in the administrative system of tribal areas are 
as follows: 
• Absence of financial and judicial accountability by the political 
administration. 
• Combination of judicial and executive functions in the PA, leading 
to many evils. 
• Undue bureaucratic hurdles for the solution of petty problems, 
because of the various bottlenecks in the existing system of 
administration62. 
2. Flaws in the Judicial System 
• A concept of collective and territorial responsibility that is against 
the basis of justice. 
• An absence of judicial checks on the PA and jirga because of the 
denial of the right of appeal. 
• Violations of basic human rights by the FCR63. 
• Non-qualification of jirga members for the job, leading to overly 
simplistic decisions. 
                                            
62 Ali Mumtaz Bangash, The Political Administration of Tribal Areas; A Historical and 
Organizational Perspective (Peshawar: Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1998), 17. 
63 Khalid Aziz, The Frontier Crimes Regulation and Administration of the Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan. Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Challenges and Response. (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute, 2005), 117. 
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• Vulnerability of the jirga to power centers of wealth, social status 
and political influence. 
• Delayed justice due to bureaucratic lethargy, as all major decisions 
are vetted by the PA. 
3. Political Situation 
The government-formed agency councils in 2002 reneged on their 
promise of elected local councils. As a result, most members of these councils 
are handpicked nominees of the government, like the maliks themselves. The 
unelected councils have further strengthened the existing corrupt system in the 
FATA and reinforce the peoples’ distrust of the government. 
B. SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
Modernization consists of displacing local dependence with 
dependence on external markets and by doing so, integrates the 
village community into the region, the nation, and, through foreign 
transaction, the rest of the world.64 
Interestingly, this view of economic development can also be adopted in 
the FATA as well. Therefore, it is imperative that the economic situation in the 
FATA be improved if a viable process of integration is to materialize. 
1. Reasons for FATA Economic Backwardness 
The backwardness of the FATA can be attributed to multiple reasons. 
Some of these are: 
• The tribal nature of the society, which tends to isolate the area from 
outsiders65. 
• Social and political instability in the FATA, which has not allowed 
worthwhile socioeconomic activity and has deterred outside 
investors66. 
                                            
64 Ainslie Embree, et al, Pakistan’s Western Borderlands (Vikas, 1977), 87. 
65 Rehman, “Viability of Extending,” 8. 
66 “Pakistan Participatory Poverty Assessment: Federally Administered Tribal Areas,” policy 
briefing note, accessed on June 2, 2012,  
http://www.opml.co.uk/docs/07_FATA_Policy_Briefing_Note.pdf. 
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• Lack of clear government policies, which allow for very few 
developmental works. 
• An influx of refugees, which has brought a severe strain to the 
economy of the area. 
• Maliks and tribal elders who do not allow development for fear of 
loosening their hold on tribal people. 
• The constitutional position of the FATA, which restricts 
development, as no checks exist on the maliks and the political 
administration responsible for proper utilization of development 
funds. 
C. THE MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION 
The challenges posed by the FATA go beyond immediate threats 
associated with the international war on terrorism. The following list of shortfalls 
can be observed in the overall conduct of military operations at the micro and 
macro levels. 
• Lack of effective media campaigns to counter the propaganda of 
miscreants. 
• Inadequate intelligence setup. 
• Lack of adequate training and equipment for army units and law 
enforcement agencies operating in the area. 
• Absence of a coordinated long-term strategy, except disjointed 
development works, for winning the hearts and minds of the people 
• Inadvertent strengthening of the maliki system by overreliance on 
maliks. 
• Ad hoc stationing of the army in different areas. 
• An ineffective dialogue process with political parties and local 
people. 
• Lack of physical barriers to restrict movement across borders. 
• Inadequate measures to prevent collateral damage. 
D. OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR INTEGRATION OF THE FATA 
Various options are mentioned below, along with an analysis of each. 
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1. Option 1, Independent and Autonomous Status with 
Modifications in the FCR and Administrative System 
This option is an improved status quo. Problems in the judicial and 
administrative systems will be partially addressed and changes will bring about 
some amount of administrative efficiency and effectiveness. However, this option 
is a continuation of the existing system against the will of the masses and will 
only provide a short-term solution. 
2. Option 2, Creation of a New Province by Amalgamating the 
FATA and FRs 
In this option, tribes will have their own government in their own area. 
Multifarious complications related to merger will be minimized and tribes will 
maintain their identity under provincial autonomy. However, the FATA lacks 
geographical continuity and natural resources; therefore, this option is not 
economically viable. It will strengthen subnationalists in other provinces and will 
not be supported by the people of the NWFP because of the splitting of the 
Pashtun population. The purpose of integration will not be fully realized. 
3. Option 3, Progressive Political Merger into the NWFP 
This implies a gradual integration of the FATA into the NWFP through the 
instruments of massive development and political changes. At the same time, a 
phased approach would be adopted by first merging the PATA, followed by FRs 
and finally the FATA, with the provincial government of the NWFP. It suits the 
social and cultural homogeneity of the FATA and the NWFP and will have no 
shock-action effect because of its gradual nature. However, this process will be 
time consuming, thereby necessitating a strong will of the government to 
continue the policy. This solution will be relatively slow, while the ground situation 
demands rapid overhaul of the judicial systems and a better law and order 
environment, to restore people’s confidence in the government and its will to find 
a lasting solution to the FATA quagmire.  
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4. Option 4, Agency-Wise Integration Strategy 
In this option, the merger of the PATA and FRs with the NWFP is 
envisioned, to be carried out immediately, followed by the FATA, in three phases. 
As an example, this could be done by merging the Khyber and Orakzai agencies 
in Phase One, followed by Bajaur, Mohamand, and Kurram agencies in Phase 
Two and finally the North and South Waziristan agencies in Phase Three. This 
manageable approach is based on the existing level of development in the 
different agencies. The initial two agencies can act as role models for the others 
and will allow sufficient time to prepare the people of other agencies for the 
change. A potential problem is that any failure in the first phase will jeopardize 
the entire process. These changes will be strongly opposed by beneficiaries of 
the current system, who will lose their status. 
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VI. APPLICABILITY OF INFORMATION OPERATION TOOLS TO 
ACHIEVE FATA INTEGRATION  
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Information operations (IO) is defined as: 
Coordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or 
potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by 
undermining his will, cohesion, and decision-making ability, through 
affecting his information, information-based processes, and 
systems while protecting one’s own decision makers and decision-
making processes.67 
An adversary’s effectiveness is a function of his will and capability. IO 
focuses on influencing will and on affecting those capabilities that directly enable 
the application of will. IO is targeted at all audiences at any level capable of 
influencing the situation, whether adversary, friendly or uncommitted. IO aims to 
influence the adversary’s perceptions and will, undermining cohesion and 
shaping the battle space. For example, by questioning the legitimacy of their 
leadership and cause, IO may undermine their moral power base, separating 
leadership from supporters; political, military and public, thus weakening their 
desire to continue and affecting their actions. IO aims to reinforce and protect the 
will of friends and allies by strengthening resolve and by countering adversary 
attempts to influence it, in order to maintain friendly cohesion and reinforce 
freedom of action. IO also aims to present and promote the alliance case to 
uncommitted audiences and influence their perceptions in our favor. Ultimately, 
IO seeks to affect actions; it helps shape the battle space, attacking the 
adversary’s cohesion and protecting our own, while exploiting the situation. It can 
make use of all military activities to attack or defend will and capability and is 
integrated with broader military activity as part of the campaign plan. Clearly, 
attacks on capability also have an effect on will and vice versa; therefore, IO and 
                                            
67 Director General, Joint Doctrine and Concepts, Joint Welfare Publication 3-80, Information 
Operations, June 2002, http://www.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2270/jwp3_80.pdf. 
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broader military activity must be carefully integrated to ensure that the desired 
overall impact is achieved. Two main aspects of IO are influence activity, which is 
the primary means of influencing will, and counter-command activity (CCA), 
which attacks capability. However, each may have an impact on the other and 
they should not be considered exclusive activities. All activities, be they on will or 
capability, are dependent on the provision of good information, which is 
supported and protected through information activity.68 
B. HURDLES IN INTEGRATING IO WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS 
Doctrine, intelligence support and resourcing and funding to IO are 
primary issues to tackle. Most military commanders are not well aware of how to 
integrate IO into their operations. The military doctrine of various countries does 
not provide military commanders adequate guidance for integrating IO into 
their operations. Doctrine presents IO in a disjointed manner and as a function 
that is essentially separate from the commander’s other requirements and 
missions—not as something that must be integrated into all his requirements 
and missions. Second, IO requires proper intelligence support to be effective, 
but intelligence doctrine and resourcing do not allow intelligence support to IO 
to be effective. Intelligence doctrine provides little practical guidance on support 
to IO and intelligence professionals are currently unprepared to provide the in-
depth analysis of the information environment that IO requires. Third, most 
militaries have allocated resources to conduct IO in an effective manner. Due 
to the combined effect of all of this, the information mechanism fails to 
adequately portray the information environment. Also, it hinders the activities 
through which commanders can process the reporting that would allow them to 
analyze and portray the information environment. Professional military education 
and unit- training programs do not stress IO as an integrated function and do 
not present commanders with realistic situations in which they may achieve 




success in the information environment. As a result of these three issues, 
commanders just do not understand how to integrate IO.69 
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IO AND IW 
Before dwelling further into what information warfare (IW) and IO is, it is 
appropriate to define what information is: 
(D)ata that (1) has been verified to be accurate and timely, (2) is 
specific and organized for a purpose, (3) is presented within a 
context that gives it meaning and relevance and (4) that can lead to 
an increase in understanding and decrease in uncertainty. The 
value of information lies solely in its ability to affect a behavior, 
decision or outcome. A piece of information is considered valueless 
if, after receiving it, things remain unchanged.70 
IO more specifically is: 
(T)he integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer-
network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), 
military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in 
concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to 
influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and 
automated decision making while protecting our own.71 
The information warfare definition is not that precise. It lacks a common 
vocabulary. It is also referred to as the “fifth dimension of warfare.” Some 
definitions of IW are so broad that it appears to be covering all human 
endeavors.72 Nevertheless, we can say that IW is the use of information, or 
information systems, to disrupt or destroy an organization perceived to be an 
enemy. The overriding objective is to coerce the target to act in a way that is 
favorable to the attacker’s wishes and overall plan. The use of information to 
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gain advantage over an adversary is not new; however, the magnitude of the 
impact of these tactics has increased in this information age. Society as a 
whole is feeling the impact and accompanying massive changes as information 
increasingly becomes a source of power, influence and economic gain. There 
are a number of definitions available, which describe the term IO in various 
manners. There seems to be conflicting views about this term among scholars 
and warfare experts. One such definition is “the use of information or 
information technology during a time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote 
specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.”73  
D. OVERALL IO PERSPECTIVE (UNITED STATES) 
1. The Information Environment 
The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, 
organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or 
act on information. The actors include leaders, decision makers, 
individuals, and organizations. Resources include the materials and 
systems employed to collect, analyze, apply, or disseminate 
information. The information environment is one in which humans 
and automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon 
information, and it is therefore the principal environment of decision 
making. Even though the information environment is considered 
distinct, it resides within each of the four domains. The information 
environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, 
informational, and cognitive.74 
a. The Physical Dimension 
The physical dimension is composed of the command and control 
(C2) systems and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals 
and organizations to conduct operations.75 
In Pakistan, this dimension has been further augmented and given 
the name of C4I2SR, which stands for command, control, communications, 
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computers, intelligence, IO, surveillance and reconnaissance. Under this 
umbrella, all related activities are also covered. It is also the dimension where 
physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. 
This includes the means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups 
and populations. 
Comparatively, the elements of this dimension are the easiest to 
measure, and consequently combat. Power has traditionally been 
measured primarily in this dimension.76 
b. The Informational Dimension 
The informational dimension is where information is collected, 
processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the 
dimension where the C2 of modern military forces is 
communicated, and where the commander’s intent is conveyed. It 
consists of the content and flow of information. Consequently, it is 
the informational dimension that must be protected.77 
If information is breached in this stage, the overall effectiveness of 
any impending operation is degraded to a great extent. In Pakistan, this 
dimension is mostly looked after by the respective services’ intelligence setups, 
under the umbrella of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. 
c. The Cognitive Dimension 
The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision 
maker and the target audience (TA). This is the dimension in which 
people think, perceive, visualize, and decide.78 
The Strategic-Planning Division (SPD) in Pakistan, in collaboration 
with the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) directorate, takes care of this 
dimension. 
Factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, state 
of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as 





well as public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and 
rumors influence this dimension”79. 
Therefore, operations like PSYOP have a major role to play here. 
2. Principles of Information Operations and Core IO Capabilities 
Success in military operations depends on collecting and 
integrating essential information while denying it to the adversary 
and other target audiences.80 
Basically, this constitutes the most essential and critical element of any 
campaign. Of the five core IO capabilities, PSYOP, OPSEC and MILDEC have 
played a major part in military operations for many centuries, now they have 
been joined by EW and CNO. The following outlines of IO capabilities have 
been taken directly from the referenced documents and are provided as 
background. 
a. Psychological Operations 
PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected truthful 
information and indicators to target audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of their governments, 
organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP are to induce or 
reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. 
PSYOP personnel advise the commander on methods to capitalize on the 
psychological impacts of every aspect of force employment and how to develop 
a strategy for developing and planning the dissemination of specific PSYOP 
programs. During a crisis, a PSYOP assessment team (POAT) is deployed. A 
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dissemination and logistics specialists. The POAT assesses the situation, 
develops PSYOP objectives and recommends the appropriate level of support 
to accomplish the mission.81 
b. PSYOP as an IO Core Capability 
In today’s information environment, even PSYOP conducted at the 
tactical level can have strategic effects. Therefore, PSYOP has an approval 
process that must be understood, and the necessity for timely decisions is 
fundamental to effective PSYOP and IO. This is particularly important in the 
early stages of an operation, given the time it takes to develop, design, 
produce, distribute, disseminate and evaluate PSYOP products and actions. 
PSYOP must be coordinated with counterintelligence (CI), MILDEC and OPSEC 
to ensure deconfliction and control. There must be close cooperation and 
coordination between PSYOP and PA staff in order to maintain credibility with 
their respective audiences. The effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the 
synchronization and coordination of the core, supporting and related 
capabilities of IO, particularly PA, MILDEC, CNO, CMO and EW.82 
c. Military Deception 
MILDEC is described as those actions executed to deliberately 
mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions 
and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions that will 
contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces’ mission. MILDEC and 
OPSEC are complementary activities; MILDEC seeks to encourage incorrect 
analysis, causing the adversary to arrive at specific false deductions, while 
OPSEC seeks to deny real information to an adversary and prevent the correct 
deduction of friendly plans. All information operations capabilities have 
competing priorities for the resources required for deception and the 
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resources required for the real operation. For this reason, the deception plan 
should be developed concurrently with the real plan.83 
d. MILDEC as an IO Core Capability 
MILDEC is fundamental to successful IO. It exploits the adversary’s 
information systems, processes and capabilities. MILDEC relies upon 
understanding how the adversary commander and supporting staff think and 
plan and how they use information management to support their efforts. Each 
of the core, supporting and related capabilities has a part to play in the 
development of successful MILDEC and in maintaining its credibility over time.84 
e. Operations Security 
OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and 
subsequently analyzing friendly actions and other activities to identify what 
friendly information is necessary for the adversary to have sufficiently 
accurate knowledge of friendly forces and intentions; deny adversary decision 
makers critical information about friendly forces and intentions and cause 
adversary decision makers to misjudge the relevance of known critical friendly 
information.85 
f. OPSEC as an IO Core Capability 
OPSEC complements MILDEC by denying adversary information 
required to both assess a real plan and to disprove a deception plan. The 
process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and taking 
measures to mask them from disclosure to adversaries is only one part of a 
defense-in-depth approach. To be effective, other types of security measures 
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like physical security, information assurance (IA) programs, computer network 
defense (CND), etc., must complement OPSEC.86 
g. Electronic Warfare 
EW refers to any military action involving the use of 
electromagnetic (EM) and directed energy to control the EM spectrum. EW 
includes three major subdivisions: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection 
(EP) and electronic warfare support (ES). EA involves the use of EM energy, 
directed energy or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities or 
equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary 
combat capability. EP ensures the friendly use of the EM spectrum. ES consists 
of actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to 
search for, intercept, identify and locate or localize sources of intentional and 
unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat 
recognition, targeting, planning and conducting of future operations.87 
h. EW as an IO Core Capability 
EW contributes to the success of IO by using offensive and 
defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of combinations to shape, disrupt 
and exploit adversarial use of the EM spectrum while protecting friendly freedom 
of action in that spectrum. The increasing prevalence of wireless telephone 
and computer usage extends both the utility and threat of EW. All of the core, 
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i. Computer Network Operations 
CNO is one of the latest capabilities developed in support of military 
operations. In recent publications and doctrinal changes this is being increasingly 
referred to as “Cyber”. CNO stems from the increasing use of networked 
computers and supporting information technology (IT) infrastructure 
systems by military and civilian organizations. CNO, along with EW, is used to 
attack, deceive, degrade and disrupt core, supporting and related IO capabilities 
and to deny, exploit and defend electronic information and infrastructure.89 
j. CNO as an IO Core Capability 
The increasing reliance of sophisticated militaries and terrorist 
groups on computers and computer networks to pass information to C2 forces 
reinforces the importance of CNO in IO plans and activities. As the capability 
of computers and the range of their employment broaden, new vulnerabilities 
and opportunities continue to develop. This offers opportunities to attack and 
exploit an adversary’s computer system weaknesses.90 
3.  Information Operations Supporting Capabilities 
Capabilities supporting IO include IA, physical security, physical attack, CI 
and COMCAM. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the 
information environment and contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated 
and coordinated with the core capabilities.91 
a. Information Assurance 
IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of 
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information systems by incorporating protection, detection and reaction 
capabilities. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority.92 
b. IA as a Supporting Capability for IO 
IO depends on IA to protect information and information systems. 
IA and IO have an operational relationship in which IO is concerned with the 
coordination of military activities in the information environment, while IA protects 
the electronic and automated portions of the information environment. IA and all 
aspects of CNO are interrelated and rely upon each other to be effective.93 
c. Physical Security 
Physical security is concerned with physical measures designed to 
safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, 
material and documents and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, 
damage and theft. The physical security process includes determining 
vulnerabilities to known threats and applying appropriate deterrent, control and 
denial techniques responding to changing conditions.94 
d. Physical Security as a Supporting Capability for IO 
Just as IA protects friendly electronic information and information 
systems, physical security protects physical facilities containing information and 
information systems. Physical security often contributes to OPSEC, particularly in 
the case of MILDEC, when compromise of the MILDEC activity could 
compromise the real plan.95 
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e. Physical Attack 
The concept of attack is fundamental to military operations. 
Physical attack disrupts, damages or destroys adversary targets through 
destructive power. Physical attack can also be used to create or alter adversary 
perceptions or drive an adversary to use certain exploitable information 
systems.96 
f. Physical Attack as a Supporting Capability for IO 
Physical attack can be employed in support of IO as a means of 
attacking C2 nodes to affect enemy’s ability to exercise C2. IO capabilities, like 
PSYOP for example, can be employed in support of a physical attack to 
maximize the effect of the attack on the morale of an adversary.97 
g. Counterintelligence 
CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to 
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities or sabotage conducted by 
or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof.98 
h. CI as a Supporting Capability for IO 
CI procedures are a critical part of guarding friendly information and 
information systems. A robust security program that integrates IA, physical 
security, CI and OPSEC with risk-management procedures offers the best 
chance to protect friendly information and information systems from adversary 
actions.99 
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i. Combat Camera 
The COMCAM mission is to provide the combatant commands and 
other higher-ups with an imagery capability in support of operational and 
planning requirements across the range of military operations.100 
j. Combat Camera as a Supporting Capability for IO 
COMCAM supports all of the capabilities of IO that use images of 
friendly force operations to influence an adversary or support its own forces or 
allies. They provide images for PSYOP, MILDEC, PA, and Civil-Military 
Operations (CMO) use, but can also be used for BDA or measures of 
effectiveness (MOE) analysis. COMCAM can also provide records of IO actions 
for subsequent rebuttal proceedings.101 
k. Information Operations Related Capabilities 
These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must 
always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO 
capabilities. However, the primary purpose and rules under which they operate 
must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration 
in the planning and conducting of IO.102 
l. Public Affairs 
PA is public information, command information and community 
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essential for joint forces information superiority and credible PA operations are 
necessary to support the commander’s mission and to maintain essential public 
liaisons.103 
m. Civil-Military Operations104 
CMOs are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 
influence or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-
governmental civilian organizations and authorities and the civilian populace. 
They are conducted across the range of military operations to address root 
causes of instability, assist in reconstruction after conflict or disaster or may be 
conducted independent of other military operations. CMOs may include 
performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally the 
responsibility of local, regional or national government.105 
n. CMO as a Related Capability to IO 
CMOs can be particularly effective in peacetime and pre or post-
combat operations when other capabilities and actions may be constrained. Early 
consideration of the civil–military environment in which operations will take place 
is important. As with PA, the CMO staff also has an important role to play in the 
development of broader IO plans and objectives. Distribution of information about 
CMO efforts and results through PA and PSYOP can affect the perceptions of a 
broader audience and favorably influence key groups or individuals.106 
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o. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy 
DSPD consists of activities and measures taken by military and 
state components, in the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy 
efforts of the government.107 
4. How IO Targets an Adversary 
IO may target human decision making or automated decision 
support systems with specific actions. Technology allows 
automated decision making to be targeted with increasing precision 
and affords more sophisticated ways to protect it. The focus of IO is 
on the decision maker and the information environment in order to 
affect decision making and thinking processes, knowledge, and 
understanding of the situation.108 
5. How IO Can Affect Data 
IO can affect data, information, and knowledge in three basic ways: 
 
• By taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions 
that add, modify, or remove information from the environment of 
decision makers. 
• By taking actions to affect the infrastructure that collects, 
communicates, processes, and/or stores information in support of 
decision makers. 
• By influencing the way people receive, process, interpret, and 
use data, information, and knowledge.109 
6. Various Effects which Can Be Achieved through IO 
All IO capabilities may be employed in both offensive and 
defensive operations. Commanders use IO capabilities 
simultaneously to accomplish the mission, increase their force 
effectiveness, and protect their organizations and systems. 
Commanders can use IO capabilities to accomplish the following: 
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• Destroy: To damage a system or entity so badly that it 
cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition 
without being entirely rebuilt. 
• Disrupt: To break or interrupt the flow of information. 
• Degrade: To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary 
C2 or communication systems, and information collection efforts or 
means. IO can also degrade the morale of a unit. 
• Deny:  To prevent the adversary from accessing and using 
critical information, systems, and services. 
• Deceive: To cause a person to believe what is not true. 
• Exploit: To gain access to adversary C2 systems to collect 
information or to plant false or misleading information 
• Influence: To cause others to behave in a manner favorable to 
own forces. 
• Protect: To take action to guard against espionage or 
capture of sensitive equipment and information. 
• Detect: To discover or discern the existence, presence, or 
fact of an intrusion into information systems. 
• Restore: To bring information and systems back to their 
original state. 
• Respond: To react quickly to an adversary’s or others’ IO attack 
or intrusion.110 
E. EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICABILITY OF IO IN DEFUSING THE 
FATA SITUATION 
1. Psychological Operations 
Although PSYOP are planned to convey selected information to target 
audiences, the applicability of PSYOP cannot be ruled out for conveying selected 
truth to the people of the FATA. Though this capability has not been used against 
the domestic or local population, considering the special circumstances 
prevailing in the FATA, it could be appropriate to do so. The people of the FATA 
have few economic opportunities compared to others living in other parts of 
Pakistan. Since no mega projects have been initiated in the area in an effort to 
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uplift the local population, economic indicators are far below the required index. 
Inhabitants of this region are not conversant with terms like industry, business 
and public-related services. The only way that the FATA can escape this 
economic muddle is to start mega projects in these areas. Maliks and local 
sardars, or tribal elders, are resisting government efforts, since they do not want 
people to prosper and stand on their own feet. They consider this scenario a 
grave challenge to their hegemony in the area. PSYOP presents opportunities to 
counter their resistance and if necessary, negate their influence. 
A strong theme that will “sell like hot cakes” in the FATA is that the natural 
resources of the FATA have been exploited by the local politicos and tribal 
elders, who have mostly used these for their personnel gains and to pile up their 
own personnel wealth. Tribal heads have not used money to construct schools 
and universities in the area. They have not initiated any welfare task for the local 
populace, such as hospitals and other useful institutions in the social sector. 
It is very important to understand that a “one solution fits all” approach will 
not work in the FATA since the dynamics in the area are different from one 
agency to another. A thorough analysis is required to develop themes for 
individual tribes or group of tribes who have common traditions and cultural 
values or links. All available means, such as print media, the internet, electronic 
media and local influential elders, should be included in the overall scheme to 
address the problem squarely, keeping in view the intellectual and social setup of 
the target audiences. If the above-mentioned means are used in a traditional 
manner, they may not be able to accrue the desired effects and prove 
counterproductive. In a tribal society, local religious heads are considered to be 
more trustworthy than any form of electronic or print media. It will be very useful if 
PSYOPs are launched to change the mindset of these religious heads; that, in 
turn, can increase the message’s impact. This would further influence the local 
population, regardless of the message content, a practice known as using a 
credible communicator or source. If used with care and ingenuity, this core 
capability has immense chances to succeed in the FATA environment. 
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2. Military Deception 
Military Deception consists of actions that are performed to intentionally 
mislead the opponent decision maker in order to facilitate the mission 
accomplishment of friendly forces. Anyone who makes a decision that affects the 
military could be a deception target; the individual may not necessarily be a 
person in uniform. In Pakistan, the president, though is a civilian, can be a 
lucrative target, since he makes decisions that affect the military. In FATA, there 
is a need to focus on the terrorist or miscreant decision makers. Efforts should be 
made to try to influence him to take actions that are counterproductive to his 
force objectives and suit our design. The intent and means of deception should 
be guarded ruthlessly. Efforts should be made so that information reaches our 
intended deception target well in time and the deception theme should be well 
knitted into the overall operational plan of the forces conducting security 
operations in the region. Theater-level deceptions, if planned, are to be 
dovetailed with tactical deceptions to achieve synergy in effort. Good intelligence 
is the heart of deception. Security apparatus in the FATA can collect intelligence 
about the intentions and perceptions of miscreants and can then initiate actions 
that reinforce terrorist perceptions. However, the actual operation must be 
planned counter to the perceptions of miscreants and terrorists. Monitoring 
indicators are important throughout the deception to ascertain whether terrorists 
are becoming prey to our enticement or not. Good operational security pays rich 
dividends. We must eliminate indicators that can give away deception themes, 
lest terrorists not take the bait.  
Groups of fighters supporting pro-security forces, or peace battlers, are 
groups of individuals in the area who claim to be peace loving and fight 
miscreants and terrorists along with security forces troops. Security forces in the 
area can make a display of them to protect their camp or village in order to deter 
an attack from miscreants. This can be spread in the area so that all pro-security 
forces groups, camps and villages are protected by the regular fighting troops of 
the security forces. This will not be true and may work for a limited period of time, 
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but with efficient OPSEC management, this theme can work for a considerable 
period of time. It not only raises the morale of the peace battlers, in that security 
forces are with them, but it also deters miscreants from launching an attack on 
security forces sympathizers. Most miscreants and terrorists believe that security 
forces in the region are overstretched, due to the vastness of the area. In 
addition, troops who are assigned to hold a post or locality are understrength and 
therefore lack enough force to defend the post or locality at night. This terrorist 
perception can be reinforced by manning a post or locality with minimum 
strength, but keeping a strong, quick-reaction force nearby to cause maximum 
damage to miscreants if they decide to attack the post. 
3. Operations Security 
The success of any operation largely depends upon how a force can hide 
its signature from the enemy. If the details of the operation can be hidden from 
the adversary’s decision makers, then the chance of success multiplies. 
Operations security needs to be maintained at all times. Since it is not possible to 
hide each and every possible detail, it is important that at least all critical 
information be identified and hidden from the adversary. Security forces in the 
FATA can hide their critical information to include force structure and intentions. 
This supports deception, as discussed in the previous section. Security forces 
can mislead the adversary to pick some part of the information that is not 
relevant or critical and subsequently base their response on a misjudged piece of 
information. Information can be intentionally fed to the miscreants in such a 
manner that they feel that they have some trusted and authenticated piece of 
information contrary to information that could be of any use to them. 
4. Electronic Warfare 
Electronic warfare can be very useful if planned and deployed judiciously 
so as to achieve desired results with minimum collateral damage and fratricide. 
The use of wireless and satellite telephones in the FATA by miscreants has 
become very common. They have also started to use local radio stations to 
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broadcast their messages to the local population. These messages are mostly 
threatening and sometimes used to discredit the security forces present in the 
region. A new blending of messages has come to the limelight, in which terrorists 
and miscreants in a region have started to announce punishments to all 
individuals alleged to be helping security forces. 
Due to the increased importance of the electromagnetic spectrum to 
enemy and friendly forces, EW has gained considerable significance in the 
region. EW capabilities can be used to monitor, locate, and exploit the wireless 
traffic of the miscreants while protecting friendly communication. All three 
elements of EW, i.e., electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic 
warfare support, should be used in unison to supplement and support each other 
and with the resolve to degrade, neutralize or destroy the miscreant’s combat 
capability. Friendly use of the EM spectrum in a region must be assured at all 
times, in support of military operations and objectives. All efforts should be made 
to locate and identify sources of broadcast that harass and influence locals and 
compel them to fight against security forces. There is a compelling need to use 
ES capabilities to intercept, identify and locate or localize sources of enemy 
transmissions that threaten military and governmental objectives in the region. 
5. Computer Network Operations 
A thorough analysis of computer network operations capabilities of 
miscreants in the FATA reveals that they do not have any sophisticated 
computer-based or network infrastructure. Therefore, there is little need or 
opportunity to utilize CNO in the FATA at present. However, our own computer 
and network-based infrastructure needs to be protected at all times. Terrorists 
and miscreants are making use of the Internet through satellite and other cell 
phones, though on a very small scale; these can be tracked easily through 
network-monitoring tools and protocol analyzers. Through hacking techniques, 
they can be exploited to access the cell phones of miscreants in order to delete 
their cell messages and disrupt the flow of information, paralyzing their 
 51 
communication and decision making ability. A data pattern can be obtained to 
analyze what sites these miscreants have been visiting frequently. Statistics can 
also be obtained for a useful analysis at a later stage. Miscreant connections to 
the outside world are a big concern and can be traced with sophisticated 
mathematical models, such as dark networks. These tools can further help in 
unearthing organizational hierarchies and behaviors of terrorist networks. This 
data can be shared globally to bust exposé organizations, which are helping and 
assisting these elements from the outside world. 
F. INFORMATION-OPERATIONS SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES 
“The supporting IO capabilities are either directly or indirectly involved in 
the information environment and contribute to effective IO campaign.”111 If not 
all, then most of the supporting IO capabilities are very much pertinent to the 
FATA. There would be a need to integrate and coordinate these supporting 
capabilities with core capabilities and conventional military activities. Sometimes 
they appear to be overlapping with core capabilities, so their integration and 
coordination is a must for a successful IO campaign in support of military 
operations. 
1. Information Assurance 
In order to succeed in the FATA it is must that all parameters of 
information assurance are strictly adhered to. All efforts must be made to protect 
our information system by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation. Protecting our information systems against a 
possible terrorist threat will pay rich dividends in any future operation in the 
FATA. Miscreants do not currently have the ability to launch an attack against 
friendly information systems; however they are quite capable of hiring the 
expertise of some international or homegrown terrorists and causing severe 
damage to information systems of security forces deployed in the FATA. 
                                            
111 3-13 Information Operations. 
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2. Physical Security 
This has two dimensions. The first is the physical measures for the safety 
of personnel to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material 
and documents and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage 
and theft. The second is related to physical aspects of security. The prevailing 
environment in the FATA dictates that the second aspect has more weight. One 
big impediment that security forces are confronted with is the identification 
between friend and foe. If an innocent individual is mistaken for a terrorist and 
killed, the consequences are grave. Security forces lose the support of the locals; 
whereas, on the other hand, if some miscreants are able to get inside the camp 
or military installation and successfully blow themselves up, it demoralizes the 
troops and creates frustration among the ranks for not being able to identify the 
enemy. 
3. Physical Attack 
The kinetic approach is an extreme course of action. At times it becomes 
necessary if all other options have been tried and failed. Military operations in the 
FATA are ongoing because terrorists have refused to lay down their arms and 
are unwilling to accept any solution that nullifies their unlawful hegemony in the 
region. The Pakistani army faces a unique situation that is complex and has 
varied dimensions. It has to fight and launch operations against its own people, a 
very sensitive issue. Any stern action raises clamor from all corners of the 
country, terming it unjustified, mostly from religious parties and opposition 
parties, for minor political gains. Therefore, it is important to try all other means 
available before launching any offensive military operation. Some religious 
parties are even skeptical of the army’s presence in the FATA and demand 
quick, unconditional withdrawal. 
 If physical attack becomes an absolute necessity, use of minimum force 
at selected locations where terrorist and miscreant hideouts exist should be 
planned to flush out the criminals and give peace a fair chance to succeed. 
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Foreign elements are playing an active role to further deteriorate conditions in the 
FATA. Most of the opposition in the FATA receives sophisticated arms from 
these foreign elements, which they use to challenge security forces deployed in 
the region. If these miscreants and terrorists are not defeated militarily, a majority 
of the local population will lose confidence in the ability of the armed forces to 
combat terrorism in the region. Apprehension will grow that the entire society 
may surrender to these miscreants. If the writ of the government and rule of law 
is not established in these areas, it will give the impression to miscreants that 
government is not capable of handling the situation and the silent majority in 
these areas, who are mostly peace loving, will become hostage to the 
miscreants. Therefore, carefully planned military operations should be 
conducted, but with sufficient coordination with PSYOP and other information-
related capabilities to keep people abreast of the reasons for launching such 
operations. The population needs to be made aware that the likely fruits of such 
operations can shape the FATA to become a place free from terrorists and 
miscreants, able to move forward towards greater prosperity. 
4. Counterintelligence 
Counterintelligence overlaps with operation security in its design and 
parameters. It also guards friendly information and information systems. A 
detailed security plan needs to be developed for the IO plan to succeed. Security 
planning should take into considerations IA, physical security, CI and OPSEC. A 
well-orchestrated IO plan will help in attaining objectives in these tribal areas. 
5. Combat Camera 
Combat camera has immense potential to support the success of military 
operations in the FATA. Most of the FATA areas are comprised of lofty 
mountains, thick forests and ravines, where conventional surveillance equipment 
is not very effective. Most of the radars deployed in the area work on the line-of-
sight principal and thus cannot provide coverage over the entire area. Most of the 
time, miscreants incorrectly claim they have inflicted heavy losses to law 
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enforcing agencies and falsely claim victory in combat actions. COMCAM can 
assist in ascertaining the extent of damage and thus effectively counter 
miscreant propaganda. COMCAM can help to portray the truth about messages 
and military operations in the FATA, versus the deliberate lies and propaganda 
spread and portrayed by the miscreants. 
G. INFORMATION OPERATIONS RELATED CAPABILITIES 
There are three military functions, public affairs (PA), civil–military 
operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy 
(DSPD), specified as related capabilities for IO. These capabilities 
make significant contributions to IO and must always be 
coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO 
capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under which 
they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires 
additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of 
IO.112 
For this reason, PA and CMO staffs in particular must work in close 
coordination with the IO planning staff for the entire campaign in the FATA. 
1. Public Affairs 
PA has two dimensions. First, it has to provide fact-based, true information 
to the public audience and friendly forces to counter miscreant rumors and 
baseless propaganda. A second aspect is to support OPSEC by taking the media 
into our confidence. Often, the media inadvertently releases critical information 
that jeopardizes the whole operation. In Pakistan, a number of channels have 
been granted a license to work; therefore, there are chances that, in an effort to 
break news before others, media reporters can accidently report information that 
can jeopardize the success of the whole mission. This can put the life of soldiers 
in the FATA at greater risk. The media must be taken into confidence and told to 
report with responsibility without giving away operational details of any military or 
nonmilitary operation. 
                                            
112 3-13 Information Operations. 
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It is important that the people of the FATA are told the underlying reasons 
for launching military operations. Most of the people in the FATA have been led 
to believe that the Pakistani army is in the area to assist or help other 
international players in the region who are intent on destroying Islam. Locals fall 
prey to this theme and join hands with adversaries in attacking security forces to 
protect Islam. If the PA can show that Pakistani forces are fighting inside 
Pakistani territory and fighting against those who are killing their own brethren, 
things can change dramatically. People must be made to understand the truth of 
the situation. They can be convinced by initiating themes, which will focus on 
peace as the only outcome and objective of the security forces in this region and 
that social justice and economic progress will come in its wake. 
2. Civil-Military Operations 
CMO can play a decisive role in solving problems within the FATA. CMO 
is part of a three-pronged strategy that can provide a sustainable solution to the 
FATA issue. A deterrence, dialog and development strategy is the way forward in 
the FATA. While deterrence in this discussion mainly deals with a conventional 
military solution, dialog and development have direct relationships with CMO. 
Those factions of miscreants who are willing to lay down arms but hesitate to 
approach local military commanders for various reasons can consult their local 
tribal elders, who in turn can initiate dialog with military commanders on the 
ground. Development strategies cannot make any progress until and unless 
CMO is effectively utilized. During peacetime, when no operations are in 
progress, CMO can help in building bonds of confidence and trust between 
security forces and the local population. Reaching out to locals is a strategy that 
helps with “winning the hearts and minds of people.” 
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VII. MEASURES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. PREAMBLE 
After analysis of the overall political, administrative, socioeconomic and 
security environments, it can be concluded that there is a need to undertake 
effective measures to address the issues of concern and initiate a process for 
integration of the FATA into the national mainstream of Pakistan. The 
recommendations have been divided into two major segments, short-term 
recommendations oriented towards reforms that affect a particular system and 
long-term recommendations for an overall integration plan. Because of the nature 
of problem, the distinction between the two may be somewhat blurred. 
B. SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Administrative, Judicial and Political Systems 
The authority of the auditor general should be extended to the FATA for a 
proper audit of all accounts. The authority of the political agent or jirga to award 
any unchallengeable punishment should be revoked. The jirga should be made 
free from the influence of the political agent. The jurisdiction of the high court and 
supreme court should be extended into tribal areas as well. A gradual and 
phased amendment in the FCR, a remainder of the British era, and the jirga 
system should be carried out initially. Later, the FCR should be replaced with the 
Pakistani penal code as part of the long-term plan. Administrative and judicial 
functions should be separated by appointing magistrates in the FATA. 
2. Socioeconomic Conditions 
The socioeconomic development strategy forms the focal point as it 
envisages integration of tribal areas through development. Extremely low literacy 
rates necessitate extensive improvement in the education sector and the 
establishment of schools, colleges and technical training centers. A rigorous 
development plan should be chalked out to initiate development activities in all 
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socioeconomic sectors, including infrastructure. Emphasis should be given to the 
communications and health sectors, poverty reduction and participatory 
development in all socioeconomic fields. 
a. Improvement of Road Communication 
Road communication forms the backbone for any industrial or 
economic activity. A network of roads needs to be developed to include arterial 
roads, link roads, farm-to-market roads that connect villages, linkage with 
adjoining areas of the Punjab, Balochistan and NWFP (renamed Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa) and development of roads for cross-border trade with Afghanistan. 
b. Extension of Railway Links 
Rail communication is the cheapest mode of transportation, but is 
comparatively expensive to develop. A railway link is available from Kohat and 
Dera Ismail Khan, which are mainland and settled areas. If the railway is 
extended to the tribal areas: Wana, Thall and Miranshah, it would create a 
revolutionary change in the outlook of the tribal areas, as it would connect the 
belt with the main country, reducing its isolation. 
c. Establishment of an Airport 
In view of the large distances involved, smaller airports for 
supporting operation of light aircraft may be considered at the tribal belt areas of 
Razmak/Wana and Kurram. 
d. Energy Needs 
To develop the cottage industries of the area, electric power should 
be available in most parts of the FATA. Moreover, natural gas should be provided 
for cottage industries and as a replacement for wood fuel, to conserve forests. 
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e. Revenue Records and Land Settlement 
Revenue and land records should be prepared in the same manner 
as in the rest of Pakistan, as communal land ownership in tribal areas is a major 
impediment to economic growth. An ownership system should be evolved 
through a modern land-settlement system to promote economic progress. This 
way, apart from agricultural development, individual ownership of land would 
enable the people of the FATA to seek loans for businesses by mortgaging their 
land. Settlement of land on an individual-ownership basis would also help in 
improving the socioeconomic infrastructure, which is otherwise compromised due 
to political and tribal disputes in the FATA. 
f. A Participatory Role in Development 
It is highly important that the average citizen in the tribal areas be 
provided a participatory role in the development and welfare of the area. 
Previously, only maliks have benefitted from the existing development process; 
the common person has always been ignored. 
g. Health 
People of the FATA are mainly dependent on hospital care in 
settled areas as basic health units (BHU) and hospitals are mostly undermanned 
and underequipped. These aspects need immediate attention. 
h. Revitalization of Existing Development Schemes 
A very sore and unfortunate aspect of existing development 
schemes, e.g., schools, BHUs and water supply, in the FATA is that they are left 
incomplete or, on completion, remain inactive. The developed assets decay 
without accruing any benefit to the community. A vigorous drive to reactivate all 
such schemes should be launched and strict measures should be adopted to 
avoid this in the future. 
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i. Human Resource Development 
An extremely low literacy rate necessitates extensive improvement 
in the educational sector. Education and human resource development should be 
used as a powerful instrument of socioeconomic and political change. Special 
measures should be initiated to impart technical education to the people of the 
area and increase employment opportunities. The number of degree colleges 
should be increased, including separate colleges for males and females. 
Community schools should be opened up near all major villages to impart 
primary and secondary education to the children. Existing madrassahs should be 
incorporated in the overall education strategy after a revision of their syllabus. 
 A FATA education department that can take possession of the 
schools was recently opened by the Pakistani army and needs to develop the 
necessary teaching staff as early as possible. Compulsory education for all 
children between the ages of 5 to 14 years of age must be provided. The 
members of union councils should form part of an education committee and 
should ensure that no child remains deprived of education. These committees, 
composed of local people aware of the financial positions of the parents, should 
arrange for help from the zakat, or charity, fund for needy students where 
required. The institution of the mosques can also be effectively used for 
promotion of literacy and education. 
The media play a vital role in supporting the spread of education. 
The potentials of print and electronic media should be fully utilized to motivate 
the public to support literacy programs. The government should make an effort to 
provide textbooks, stationery and lunch to the students. All this will only be 
possible if the education budget is increased substantially. 
j. Allocation of Funds 
The FATA should be included in National Finance Commission 
(NFC) awards as a separate entity, on the basis of its population and area, until 
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the time as it is merged with NWFP. The central government should provide 
loans to tribesmen to explore their own sources of sustenance.113 
k. Trade Sector 
The international efforts for reconstruction in Afghanistan and 
opening up of trade routes to the Central Asian republics offer great economic 
opportunities for Pakistan and the FATA.114 For this purpose, the opening of 
additional trade routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan should be prioritized. 
Custom regulations should be relaxed to encourage legalization of smuggling or 
informal trade. 
l. Agriculture Sector 
The FATA has great potential in the fields of fruit farming, livestock 
and forestry. The grant of attainable loans to farmers, improvement in irrigation 
networks, settlement of land and revenue records, establishment of new 
veterinary hospitals, provision of food processing facilities, launching of an 
effective forest conservation campaign, establishment of checks against 
smuggling and modernization of the timber industry will pay rich dividends. 
m. Minerals Sector 
Due to the wide variety of minerals present, the government should 
involve tribesmen in joint ventures for mineral exploration while bringing the 
whole of the FATA under geological survey mapping. 
n. Industrial Sector 
The government should provide adequate incentives to the private 
sector for industrial development of construction materials, including cement, 
                                            
113 Tariq Iqbal Burki, interview by author by email, Quetta, May 17, 2005. 
114 Iftikhar Hussain Shah, “Pakistan enjoys warm relations with ASEAN countries, says 
Iftikhar,” The News, April 30, 2004. 
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wood and marble products. The existing manufacturing facilities for small arms 
and ammunition should be modernized. 
o. Tourism Sector 
There is still a great amount of romance and attraction attached to 
the tribal areas, owing to their peculiar history and status. Promotion of tourism to 
exploit this mystique can help promote integration as well as produce a local 
economic uplift. 
3. The Security Situation 
Creation of a security environment conducive to economic activity is 
essential. The frontier constabulary and khasadar forces should be organized to 
operate as police in the area. In this multi-pronged strategy, the focal point of the 
army’s role should be to maintain a concentrated presence in the area and keep 
a low profile in day-to-day affairs.  
The following points are recommended to improve the overall security 
situation in the area and deal with ongoing problems: 
• Co-opting of the major political parties in a dialogue to build up a 
credible popular base in the larger national interest. Religious 
political parties with influence in the area should be used to allay 
misperceptions about military operations after necessary 
negotiations. 
• Permanent establishment of an effective intelligence setup. 
• Permanent stationing of the army in small cantonments across the 
FATA. 
• Integration of the local population in law enforcement agencies. 
• Execution of an effective campaign to win the hearts and minds of 
the people through meaningful reforms of the administrative 
system, coupled with extensive development works.  
• Direct interaction with the local population, bypassing the maliks. 
• Launch of an effective media campaign, to include publishing a 
white paper on the conduct of operations to neutralize the impact of 
hostile media. 
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• Special training and equipping of army units and law enforcement 
agencies operating in the area. 
• Sealing of the borders and restriction of movement within them. 
• Repatriation of Afghan refugees present in the area at the earliest 
opportunity. 
4. Applicability of IO Tools 
Information operations can play a significant role in FATA integration. 
Various themes can play a decisive role in transforming people’s opinion. People 
should be encouraged to support the establishment of a judicial system on 
similar lines as in the rest of the country. If the jurisdiction of the appellate courts 
on the provincial and federal levels is extended to the FATA, it will result in real 
and substantive changes in the tribal areas. IO tools, if applied with ingenuity, 
can enhance public awareness that socioeconomic progress in their area can 
change their lives and the lives of future generations. Illiteracy has exposed 
innocent children to miscreants’ deceitful propaganda about the values of Islam. 
IO tools can help the FATA’s inhabitants realize the fruits of constructing schools 
and universities in that region. On one hand, the application of IO tools can 
restore the confidence of security forces in their capacity to control miscreants in 
the area, while on the other hand, it will reestablish the mutual confidence 
between locals and security forces. Schools, universities and other related social 
service institutions will attract youth of the FATA and they will no longer be 
available as recruits to miscreants for fulfillment of their evil designs. 
IO can transform the Pakistani army’s strategic thinking. It can help in its 
transition from a fighting force, inherently designed to fight conventional threat, to 
a potent, lean and agile outfit that can undertake multifaceted operations in the 
FATA region. IO tools can help Pakistan develop an effective COIN strategy to 
defeat terrorism and militancy in the FATA. This also demands that the United 
States must keep working hand in glove with Pakistan to achieve common goals 
and objectives in that region. The U.S. has rendered adequate assistance to 
conduct IO in the FATA, yet increased combat camera support, EW and PA 
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assistance must be ensured and continued. Countering remote controlled IEDs, 
EW devices, and enhancing Pakistani security forces’ C4/ISR capabilities will 
have a direct impact on IO. The United States should also provide substantial 
help to Pakistan in the FATA to counter negative messages and to plan and 
conduct meaningful PSYOP. 
C. LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Elections and Representation at the Grassroots Level 
Elections for various tiers of local government should be held in a phased 
manner. In Phase 1, elections of union councils, elections at the grassroots level, 
should be held as early as possible. The functions should be as elsewhere in the 
country. These councils must have financial powers to ensure that requisite 
funds are available within each representative body and that development work 
progresses visibly and simultaneously, with maximum speed and supervision. 
Seats for women, if not filled by elections, should be filled by nomination. These 
bodies will replace the old system, which only benefitted tribal elders, with a new 
system that distributes basic amenities to the people. 
2. Merger of Frontier Regions and PATAs 
On successful conclusion of grassroots level elections, the frontier regions 
and the provincially administered tribal areas (PATAs) should be merged with the 
NWFP. The population of these regions should continue to be exempted from the 
customs act and other benefits presently being enjoyed by them should continue 
while the remaining areas of the FATA are yet to be integrated. 
3. Merger of the FATA 
A phased strategy is suggested for implementation. Through a 
constitutional package, the FATA should be given representation in the NWFP, 
renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, assembly and elections for provincial 
assemblies should be held in all agencies without changing the status of the 
FATA. The advantages would be that elected members would be able to carry 
 65 
out the political groundwork for integration of the FATA into the national 
mainstream. The chief minister would be involved in administration of the FATA, 
as the administrative machinery comes from the FATA and he would exert 
control over them through the chief secretary. This will do away with the 
artificially created compartments of the governor and chief minister.  
During the interim period, the FATA secretariat should continue to hold 
control over FATA areas and remain with the governor. Frontier crimes 
regulations should continue to remain applicable. The number of seats in the 
NWFP assembly should be determined by population in each agency and 
representation in the national assembly.  
The period for implementation should remain flexible. Based on ground 
realities, the complete merger of the FATA should be carried out within the next 
three years. Responsibility for administration should be transferred from the 
FATA secretariat to the chief minister of NWFP. All seven agencies should be 
formed into districts and absorbed into the political machinery of the NWFP 
government. Subdivisions of all agencies should be converted into tehsils. The 
writ of the government should be extended to the entire FATA, not just along 
roads and tracks. The Political Parties Act should be extended into the FATA. 
This way, the political parties would have a stake in integration of the FATA into 
the national mainstream. 
4. Economic Incentives 
To reduce opposition to integration, a number of incentives should be 
provided to the population, e.g., an exemption from state duties or taxes for a 
period of five years; additional employment opportunities in government 
departments; army and CAF registration of all cars and vehicles operating in 
tribal areas, without any duties as a onetime measure; and additional seats in 
professional colleges and stipends to children. Finally, execution of a massive 
development package must be achieved, with consultation from professionals in 
the field and supervision by the army. 
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5. Amendments to the Constitution 
Relevant acts of the constitution must be amended accordingly. All laws of 
the state should be made applicable to the FATA and the legislative authority of 
the Parliament in regards to the FATA must be applied. Initially, the FCR must be 
amended to eliminate inhumane clauses and subsequently eliminated altogether, 
while making all laws of the state applicable to the FATA. 
D. CONCLUSION 
It is said that the only thing permanent in this world is change. At times, 
change might reflect a compulsion to break the barriers formed by inherent 
stagnation spread over all those long years. Various governments in the last 58 
years have kept their eyes closed intentionally and thus, connived in the creation 
of the present state of affairs in regards to the FATA. We always forget that 
change is a self-propagating phenomenon that will actuate automatically. If we 
do not foment positive change, then negative change will foment of its own and 
the situation may actually go from bad to worse in another ten years’ time. A 
heavy burden lies on those of us who are at the helm of affairs and can realize 
good changes. The problem now is how quickly we can bring the benefits of 
modern development and raise the living standards of a people who have been 
neglected for centuries by foreign domination and alienation. The philosophy of 
administration in the tribal areas should be to convince our brothers that Pakistan 
is their country and as such, they have to be given a sense of participation and 
be assured that the government has given top priority to their welfare through 
integration into the national mainstream. 
The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point, however, is to change it.115 
—Karl Marx 
                                            
115 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works (Internaltional Publishers, 1989), 5:8. 
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APPENDIX A. MAP OF FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL 
AREAS 
 
Table 1.   Map derived from Map of NWFP, 1/1 M Scale, 10th Edition 1995, 
Published by Survey of Pakistan. Tribal agencies in NWFP 
 68 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 69 
APPENDIX B. COMPOSITION OF TRIBAL AREAS (PER 
ARTICLE 246 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION) 
Tribal Areas as defined in Article 246 of the constitution are: 
• Federally Administered Tribal Areas 












Bajaur Agency 498 289 Ultman Khel, Salarzai, Charmungi 
Mohmand Agency 887 164 Tarakzai,Halimzai, Khwaezai, Baeza  
    Safi, Mullagori, Utman Khel 
Khyber Agency 995 284 Afridi, Shinwari, Mullagori 
Orakzai Agency 403 359 Orakzai 
Kurram Agency 1305 294 Turi, Bangash,Ziamusht, Mengal 
N.W. Agency 1817 239 Utmanzai Wazir,Daur, Saidgi, Gurbaz 
S.W. Agency 2556 310 Mahsud, Ahmadzai Wazir 
F.R. Peshawar 101 37 Hassan Khel 
F.R. Kohat 363 57 Jawaki, Adam Khel 
F.R. Bannu 339 79 Jani Khel, Bakka 
F.R.D.I. Khan 1247 86 Bhittani, Sherani 
 Total 10511 2198   
Table 2.   Composition of Tribal Areas 
Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, North West Frontier Province 
A. Malakand Division 
• Chitral District 
• Dir District 
• Swat District (which includes Kalam) 
• Malakand Protected Areas 
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B. Peshawar Division (Tribal Areas adjoining Hazara District and the 
former State of Amb) 
Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, Baluchistan Province 
A. Quetta Division 
• Zhob District 
• Loralai District (excluding Duki Tehsil) 
• Dalbandin Tehsil of Chagai District 
B. Sibi Division Marri-Bugti Tribal Agency 
 
EXHIBIT 1 TO APPENDIX B. 
 

























EXHIBIT 2 TO APPENDIX B. 
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APPENDIX C. AREA AND POPULATION OF THE FATA 
Item Year Units Pakistan NWFP FATA 
FATA as 
% share of 
Pakistan 
Area - sq. km 796095 74521 27220 3.4 
Population 
Total 1998 Census  Persons 130580 17738 3176 2.4 
Male -do- -do- 67840 9086 1652 2.4 
Female -do- -do- 62740 8652 1524 2.4 
Urban -do- -do- 42459 2994 85 0.2 
Rural -do- -do- 88121 14744 3091 3.5 




98 percentage 2.61 2.82 2.19 - 
Table 3.   Area and Population of the Fata, Population Census Organization 
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. Bureau of Statistics, Planning 
and Development Department, Government of NWFP 
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APPENDIX D. THE TRIBAL HONOUR CODE – PUKHTUNWALI 
To my mind, death is better than life when life can no longer be 
held with honor. 
—Khushal Khan Khattak 
The people of the tribal area, essentially Pathans, are grouped into tight 
tribal communities: the chief being Bajauris, Mohmands, Afridis, Turis, Wazirs, 
Mahsuds and Sherains, each with its own distinct individuality, marked off from 
the other by slight differences ranging from social customs to pronunciation, but 
all knit together by a common language, culture and religion. 
A unique feature of tribal life is the jirga, a “moot” or council of tribal elders, 
which settles all intertribal disputes and acts as the spokesman for the whole 
tribe where relations with the government are concerned. In many respects, the 
tribal system of administration is reminiscent of the primary democracy of the 
city-states of ancient Greece, for it ensures effective participation for every male 
adult. Although the women have direct participation denied to them, in actual 
fact, they exercise a very real influence over their menfolk. 
Brave to the point of being reckless, impulsive and warmhearted, the 
tribesmen are ruthless enemies should one violate their code of honor. It is the 
code of honor and its sanctity and inviolability that the tribesmen cherish above 
all things. The tribesmen can be bitterest foes; they can also be the staunchest of 
friends. They are the soul of loyalty. Honor and chivalry dominate; no crime 
appears more heinous to them than letting down one’s friend. 
The Pathan outlook on life has undergone a significant change during the 
last half century. The Pathans are now awake. They have a genuine desire to 
change their socioeconomic conditions, without of course disturbing the basic 
character of tribal society and violating the pakhtunwali or Pathan code of honor. 
They want to make material progress through development of barren and bleak 
chunks of land by bringing them under the plow, using modern and mechanized 
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means of farming, by setting up new industries and above all, by fully 
participating in national and international affairs. 
Tribal customs and traditions form an inseparable part of Pashtun society. 
These are close to the heart of every Pathan and are followed religiously in tribal 
polity in spite of noticeable social change. Despite these changes, their centuries 
old traditions, social usage and customs have not changed in the slightest; 
rather, they have added luster to their way of life. These important traditions, 
writes James W. Spain116, guide community life and in many cases, influence 
and even determine the actions of individuals. 
Certain traditions of Pathans are almost universal and their knowledge is 
essential to understanding what the Pathan is and how he got that way. Pashtun 
social behavior revolves around pukhtunwali, sometimes called Nang-i-Pukhtun, 
the Pukhtun code or the Way of the Pathan. Every Pathan is aware of the main 
elements of pukhtunwali. This code has numerous laws, which in one way or the 
other are interrelated. Important ones are: 
• Nang (honor): Under this code, a tribesman is obliged to 
employ every means available to shield and protect himself, his 
honor and the honor of his family.. 
• Melmastia (hospitality): Melmastia means the showing of 
hospitality to all visitors without hope of remuneration or favor. It is 
the hallmark of tribal social customs and traditions. It enjoins the 
obligation of protection. Anyone who can gain access to the house 
of a Pathan can claim asylum from the house, regardless of the 
previous relationship between them. Incidents have occurred where 
innocent men have died defending strangers, or even their own 
personal enemies, who demanded refuge while pursued by hostile 
forces. Tribal society’s obligations of melmastia frequently led to 
difficulties under British rule. A classic case in point is melmastia for 
Osama Bin Laden, or for that matter proclaimed offenders from 
Pakistan, by the Taliban. 
• Badal (revenge): Badal permits no limits or limitation in time or 
space, regardless of cost or consequences. Blood feuds and 
enmities at times extend over generations. On the positive side, it is 
                                            
116 James W. Spain, “Political Problems of a Borderland” in Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, 
ed. Ainslee T. Embree (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1979), 4. 
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only because of these unremitting principles of revenge that crimes 
in the tribal areas are limited in number and extent. 
• Nanawatay (to seek forgiveness): Nanawatay means to go in 
and seek forgiveness from the victim to whom a wrong has been 
done. It is used when the vanquished party is prepared to go into 
the house or hujra of his enemy to beg forgiveness and make 
peace with him, usually with the Holy Quran in hand. There is no 
nanawatay when the dispute involves tor, or black, i.e, is concerned 
with the dishonor of a woman. Tor can only be converted to speen, 
or white, by the victims on agreed conditions. 
• Tor (black): Tor is a state of open guilt or infamy. It refers to those 
cases that are concerned with the honor of a woman. Tor can only 
be converted to speen by death. Because of the serious 
consequences involved, cases of adultory or illicit relations between 
sexes are extremely rare. It is important to underline that the only 
killing in tribal society that does not involve the law of revenge, is 
when a man and a woman having illicit relations are killed. 
• Tarboor (cousin): This term is used for paternal cousins and has 
a connotation of cousin rivalry in Pukhtun customs and traditions. 
The tarboor may grow up as a childhood friend and become, in 
time, the chief rival for status and political leadership within the 
lineage. It is in this competition that tarboorwali, or cousin rivalry, 
exists and manifests itself in many a conflict in the tribal area.  
• Jirga (tribal council): A jirga is an assembly of tribal elders 
who are called to decide specific issues and whose decision is 
binding on all parties in conflicts. As an institution, the jirga may 
pronounce penalties against persons or groups who do not submit 
to its decision. The jirga may also call for a lashkar, or tribal army, 
to implement its decision through force. Relations with the outside 
world are conducted through the jirga.  
• Lashkar or Lakhar (tribal army): A body of tribesmen raised 
for an offensive purpose or to deal with a particular incident. The 
strength of tribalism is manifested in the institutions of the lashkar, 
which is primarily raised to enforce the decisions of the jirga. It may 
be raised against individuals, a group, or against the outside 
powers. 
• Teega or Kanrai: A teega means a fixed date until which all 
hostilities between warring factions will be suspended. The jirga 
then ensures the implementation of a ceasefire. Any violation of the 
terms of truce, by any party, makes it liable to joint action by the 
jirga. 
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• Badragga (tribal escort): A tribal escort usually composed of 
members of that tribe through which travelers are passing. If a 
badragga is violated, a tribal feud will follow. 
• Hamsays: A word used for client or dependent groups who 
attach themselves to larger or stronger maliks. An attack against 
hamsays is considered as an attack on the protector. 
• Muajib:  The yearly or semiannual fixed allowances paid by 
the political authorities to the tribe and its various sections. 
• Lungi:  Allowances given by the political authorities to 
individual maliks. 
• Nagha:  A tribal fine decided by a council of elders and 
imposed upon the wrongdoer. It is extracted, if necessary, by force.. 
• Hujra:  A common sitting or sleeping place for males in the 
village. Visitors and unmarried young men sleep in the hujra. 
Expenses are usually shared by the village. Almost every hujra has 
a mosque attached. It is in the hujra that the hospitality of the 
Pathan is displayed.. 
• Rawaj:  The Pathan’s way of life is also governed by the rawaj 
or rawaj-i-am, customary law and by shariet, the Muslim law. Rawaj 
is more in use than the shariet and is generally preferred. 
• Malik:  Certain men are accepted as leaders and spokesmen 
for the group, on the basis of ability and experience. These are 
called maliks. A malik among the Pathans is at best, “first among 
equals.” From the point of view of the political authorities, a malik 
may often be obscurantist and obdurate, opines Akbar S. Ahmed. 
His main objectives are then to maximize individual gains, not tribal 
gains. In the present times, with such vast development schemes 
afoot, the malik may well ignore tribal benefits to better his 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the political authorities. He may 
actually have two reasons for doing so. The first and obvious one is 
the expectation of monetary or other rewards. The second is more 
subtle. He feels that with any change in the status quo of the 
village, whether in the educational or economic spheres, there 
comes a corresponding change in his social position and political 
hegemony. 
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APPENDIX E. THE DURAND LINE AGREEMENT (1893)117 
Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir of 
Afghanistan and its Dependencies on the one part, and Sir Henry Mortimer 
Durand, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, representing the 
Government of India on the other part, whereas certain questions have arisen 
regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His 
Highness the Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and the Government of India, are 
desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the 
limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future, there may be 
no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is 
hereby agreed as follows:  
• The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, 
from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in 
the map (not reproduced) attached to this agreement. 
• The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the 
territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His 
Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the 
territories lying beyond this line on the side of India. 
• The British Government thus agrees to His Highness, the Amir, 
retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His 
Highness agrees on the other hand, that, he will at no time exercise 
interference in Swat, Bajawar or Chitral including the Arnawai or 
Bashgal Valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His 
Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already 
given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the 
Wazir country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim 
to Chageh. 
• The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and 
demarcated wherever this may be practicable and desirable by 
Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to 
arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere 
with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map 
(not reproduced) attached to this agreement, having due regard to 
the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier. 
                                            
117 http://www.khyber.org/pashtohistory/treaties/durandagreement.shtml 
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• With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his 
objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the 
British Government, the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tilerai 
water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows:  
From the crest of the Khwaja Amran Range near the Pasha Kotal, 
which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction 
as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to 
Afghanistan, and to pass half way between the New Chaman Fort 
and the Afghan outpost, known locally, as Lashkar Dand. The line 
will then pass half way between the railway station and the hill 
known as the Mian Baldak, and turning southward, will rejoin the 
Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, 
and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in 
Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any 
interference within half a mile of the road. 
• The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government 
of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, as a full and 
satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion 
which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier, and both 
the Governments of India and His Highness the Amir, undertake 
that any differences of detail such as those which will have to be 
considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the 
boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove 
for the future as far as possible, all causes of doubt and 
misunderstanding between the two Governments. 
• Being fully satisfied of His Highness' good will to the British 
Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and 
strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the 
purchase and import by His Highness of ammunitions of war, and 
they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in 
order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit, in which His 
Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the 
Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs 
of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His 
Highness. 
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan H.M. Durand 
Kabul 
12 November 1893 
 81 
APPENDIX F. AGREEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF 
PAKISTAN WITH THE TRIBAL PEOPLE (1951–1952) 
Details of the agreement made by the Government of Pakistan with Tribal 
area inhabitants in 1951-52 are under118: 
• We proclaim that our territory is an integral part of the dominion of 
Pakistan and we are citizens of Pakistan. 
• We pledge our loyalty to the Constitution of Pakistan and the 
Government of Pakistan as by law established. 
• We shall remain peaceful and law abiding citizens of Pakistan and 
shall render every assistance to Government, whenever called 
upon to do so. 
• We and our tribes shall have no dealings with any other power and 
the friends of Pakistan shall be our friends and the enemies of 
Pakistan shall be our enemies. 
• We shall protect the rights and interests of Pakistan at all cost and 
shall faithfully abide by the directions given to us by the 
Government of Pakistan in this regard from time to time. 
• We shall render every assistance to the officials of the Pakistan 
Government in our areas and shall ensure their safety. 
• We shall facilitate the construction of roads, other public works, 
defence installations and establishment of communications in our 
areas and shall ensure the safety and protection of all Government 
property in our area. We shall also render every assistance to 
Government in the social and economic development of our area. 
• In the internal affairs of our tribe, the Pakistan Government will 
ensure the maintenance of our tribal customs and usages and all 
our tribal matters and internal disputes shall be settled in 
accordance with our tribal customs and in consultation with and 
through our tribal leaders. 
• The Government of Pakistan will continue to pay us our annual 
Muajib for the tribe and lungis for Maliks and representatives of our 
tribes. These grants will be subject to good behaviour and the 
fulfilment of the obligations detailed above, which our tribe has 
undertaken upon itself. 
                                            
118 Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, States and Frontier Regions Division, 
(Islamabad: "S" Block, Pakistan Secretariat). 
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• We shall attend to all summons of the officers of the Pakistan 
Government and shall call on the Political Agent, to receive our 
annual Muajibs in the spring every year. If we fail to do so, the 
Muajibs for the year shall be forfeited to the Government of 
Pakistan. 
• That, we shall abide by all the previous undertakings given and 
agreements made by us, from time to time, with the Government.  
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APPENDIX G. THE CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN,1973 
PROVISIONS ON THE TRIBAL AREAS 
Articles discussed below provide the constitutional machinery behind the 
FATA. 
A. Article 246 – Definition of Tribal Areas 
Tribal Areas include the areas in Pakistan which, immediately before the 
commencing day, were tribal areas and include: 
• The tribal areas of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier 
Province; and 
• The former States of Amb, Chitral, Dir amd Swat. 
B. Provincially Administered Tribal Areas include: 
• The districts of Chitral, Dir and Swat (which includes Kalam) (the 
tribal area in Kohistan District) Malakand Protected Area, the tribal 
area adjoining Kala Dhaka (Mansehra District) and the former State 
of Amb; and 
• Zhob District, Loralia District (Excluding Duki Tehsil), Dalbandin 
Tehsil of Chagai District and Marri and Bugti tribal territories of Sibi 
District. 
C. Federally Administered Tribal Areas include: 
• Tribal areas, adjoining Peshawar District; 
• Tribal areas adjoining Kohat District; 
• Tribal areas adjoining Bannu District; 
• Tribal areas adjoining Dear Ismail Khan District; 
• Bajaur Agency; 
• Mohmand Agency; 
• Khyber Agency; 
• Orakzai Agency; 
• Khurram Agency; 
• North Waziristan Agency; and 
 84 
• South Waziristan Agency. 
D. Article 247 - Administration of Tribal Areas 
Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation shall 
extend to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and the executive authority of 
a Province shall extend to the Provincially Administered Tribal Area therein. 
• The President may, from time to time, give such directions to the 
Governor of a province relating to the whole or any part of a Tribal 
Area within the province as he may deem necessary, and the 
Government shall, in the exercise of his function under this Article, 
comply with such directions. 
• No act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) shall apply to any Federally 
Administered Tribal Area or to any part thereof, unless the 
president so directs, and no Act of Majilsa-e- Shoora or a Provincial 
Assembly shall apply to a Provincially Administered Tribal Area, or 
to any part thereof, unless the Government to the Province in which 
the Tribal Area is situated, with the approval of the President, so 
directed; and in giving such a direction with respect to any law, the 
president or, as the case may be, the Government may direct that 
the law shall, in its application to a Tribal Area, or to a specified part 
therefore, have effect subject to such exceptions and modification 
as may be specified in the direction. 
• Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the 
President may, with respect to any matter within the legislative 
competence of Majlis-e-Shoora, and the Government of a province, 
with the prior approval of the president, may with respective to any 
matter within the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly 
make regulation for the peace and good government of a 
provincially Administrated Tribal Area or any part thereof, situated 
in the Province. 
• Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the 
president may, with respect to any matter, make regulation for the 
peace and good government of a Federally Administered Tribal 
Area or any part thereof. 
• The President may, at any time, by Order, direct that the whole or 
any part of a Tribal Area shall cease to be Tribal Area, and such 
Order may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as 
appear to the President to be necessary and proper provided that 
before making any Order under this clause, the president shall 
ascertain in such manner as he considers appropriate, the views of 
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the people of the Tribal Area concerned, as represented in Tribal 
Jirga. 
• Neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any 
Jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, 
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APPENDIX H. PROBLEM AREAS IN FRONTIER CRIMES 
REGULATIONS 1901 
The FCR, formulated by the British to exercise control over the tribal areas 
was regarded as Black Law. The major problem areas in the FCR is as 
follows119: 
• Under the FCR, the presence of lawyers is not permitted. The 
parties have a right to address the Jirga themselves. The legal 
profession opposes the FCR and is attacked by them for being 
Black Law.  
• According to subsection (4) of Section 1, there are some special 
and discriminatory provisions that are applicable only to Pathans 
and Balochs. 
• Under Clause 40, the political agent can ask anyone to provide 
security, if it is determined by him that this would prevent murder, or 
sedition. If a person fails to do so or the political agent finds the 
securities inadequate, the targeted person may be imprisoned for 
three years. Such a period of imprisonment can be extended to a 
total of six years. It is for the political agent to decide whether the 
imprisonment is to be simple or rigorous. 
• The object classification of a tribesman as almost a subhuman is 
tragic. He may be killed and no questions are asked since the FCR 
permits it [S.38 (4)]. 
• No judicial oversight is permitted, since there is a bar to the 
jurisdiction of superior courts. 
• The administration has been enabled to enter the honor code of 
Pashtunwali and has thus opened itself as possible party against 
whom badal, or revenge, can be taken. 
• The FCR goes into the concept of Melmastia. If refuge has been 
given, compliance with government demands to renege would 
insult the honor of a tribesman and/or clan. 
• Clauses 21-26 of FCR denote the concept of collective/territorial 
responsibility where whole communities can be held responsible 
and punished for an attempted or committed crime. 
                                            
119 Amir Muhammad Khan, “Justice Denied,” 
http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsDec2004/newsbeat1dec.htm, internet, July 31, 2005. 
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APPENDIX I. DETAILS OF THE DEVOLUTION PLAN 
• The Devolution Plan will be extended and local government 
institutions will be established, before the October 2002 general 
election or at March 2003. 
• Agency Nazim, to be an elected representative of the tribal 
population, will head each local government in the tribal areas. The 
present role of the Political Agent will be drastically changed from 
that of very powerful administrator to a coordinator.  
• Necessary amendments will be made in the Frontier Crimes 
Regulations to give the right of appeal and of review to the people; 
the harsh provisions of what is considered as a draconian law 
imposed by the British to suppress the tribal people will be 
abolished. 
• FATA will not be converted into a separate province at this stage to 
avoid possible disorder. It was decided that the tribal culture and 
customs of the local population would be fully protected and 
secured and the existing policy of integration through development 
would continue. 
• The financial powers of the Governor NWFP will be increased and 
his Secretariat will be strengthened to ensure the development 
process in the tribal areas. 
• Levies and Khasadars should be better trained and equipped to 
effectively control the situation in the tribal areas. 
• FATA should be given representation in the NWFP provincial 
assembly through allocation of extra seats. The representation of 
FATA in the National Assembly and the Senate will, remain 
unchanged. 
• Special development packages for the tribal areas will be 
introduced to bring them up to par with the settle areas. 
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APPENDIX J. SUMMARY OF SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Serial 
Number Item Pakistan NWFP FATA 
% of 
Pakistan 
1 Cultivated area (million hectares) 21.9 17 0.2 0.8 
2 Population per cultivated hectare  6 10 17 283.3 
3 Irrigated area (million hectares) 18.2 0.9 0.1 0.6 
4 Population per irrigated hectare 7 21 32 457.1 
5 Forested area (million hectares) 3.6 1.3 0 0.9 
6 Literacy rate  45 37.3 17.4   
7 Male 56.5 52.8 29.5   
8 Female 32.6 21.1 3   
9 Participation rate (primary) 77 64.5 N/A   
10 Population per hospital bed  1450 1869 2327 160.5 
Table 4.   Summary of Socioeconomic Indicators 
Sources: 
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APPENDIX K. COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE 
FATA 
Item Year Unit Pakistan NWFP FATA 




Post Offices 1999-2000 Number 12854 1990 195 1.5 
Telegraph Offices 1999-2000 -do- 384 44 4 1.04 
Telephone -do- -do- 3124000 316820 24283 0.8 
TV Sets 1998 -do- 273620 60665 76 0.03 
Population per 
Telephone -do- Persons 44 59 136 - 
Population per 
Post Office -do- -do- 10 9 17 - 
ROADS 
Total 1999-2000 km 248340 10134 4417 1.8 
High Type -do- -do- 138200 7431 2592 1.9 
Low Type -do- -do- 110140 2703 1825 1.7 
Road per sq km 
of area -do- -do- 0.31 0.13 0.16 - 
Table 5.   Communication Infrastructure of FATA 
Notes: 
1. Road kilometer data of NWFP for the year 1998-99. 
2. The Pakistan road km figures are Provisional. 
 
Sources: 
1. General Manager Northern Telecommunication Region, Peshawar & D.I. 
Khan. 
2. Post Master General, North Western Circle, Peshawar. 
3. Pakistan Television Corporation, Islamabad. 
4. Chief Engineer, C.D.O. Office C&W Department, Govt. of NWFP. 
5. Pakistan Economic Survey, 2000-2001. 
6. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government 
of NWFP. 
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EXHIBIT 1 TO APPENDIX K. 
 
Figure 6.   Comparison of Communication Infrastructure, Telephones and Post 
Offices 
 





























APPENDIX L. LITERACY AND EDUCATION FACILITIES IN THE 
FATA 
Item Pakistan (P) FATA 
FATA as % share 
of Pakistan 
A. Educational Institutions (number of students) 
Primary Schools Total 162500 3276 2.02 
Male 104900 2120 2.02 
Female 57600 1156 2.01 
Middle Schools Total 18400 347 1.88 
Male 10300 259 2.51 
Female 8100 88 1.08 
High Schools Total 12600 201 1.6 
Male 8000 183 2.28 
Female 4600 18 0.39 
Inter & Degree Colleges 
Total 853 9 1.06 
Male 509 9 1.76 
Female 344 - - 
B. Enrollment (by level) (nos) 
Primary Schools Total 20399000 266713 1.3 
Male 11720000 205749 1.76 
Female 8679000 60964 0.7 
Middle Schools Total 4338000 40949 0.94 
Male 2631000 37158 1.41 
Female 1707000 3791 0.22 
High Schools Total 1795000 15166 0.84 
Male 1105000 13985 1.26 
Female 690000 1181 0.17 
Inter & Degree Colleges 
Total 791000 3007 0.38 
Male 435000 3007 0.69 
Female 356000 - - 
Table 6.   Details of Literacy and Education Facilities in FATA 
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Item Pakistan (P) FATA 
FATA as % share 
of Pakistan 
C. Teaching Staff (nos) 
Primary Schools Total 373900 8988 2.4 
Male 236000 5982 2.53 
Female 137900 3006 2.18 
Middle Schools Total 92300 3588 3.88 
Male 45800 2777 6.06 
Female 46500 811 1.74 
High Schools Total 202900 3711 1.82 
Male 131600 3401 2.58 
Female 71300 310 0.43 
Inter & Degree Colleges 
Total 26942 233 0.86 
Male 16599 233 1.4 
Female 10343 - - 
D. Literacy Ratio (%) Pakistan NWFP FATA 
Both Sexes 45 37.3 17.42 
Male 56.5 52.8 29.51 
Female 32.6 21.1 3 
Table 6. Details of Literacy and Education Facilities in FATA (cont.) 
Notes: 
1. Mosque Schools are included in Primary Schools. 
2. Data was obtained in 1999-2000. 
 
Sources: 
1. Directorate of Education (FATA) Government of NWFP. 
2. Pakistan Economic Survey, 2001-2002. 
3. Provisional Census Reports of Pakistan & FATA. 
4. Census Report of FATA, 1998. 
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PAKISTAN N.W.F.P. F.A.T.A.
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APPENDIX M. DETAILS OF HEALTH FACILITIES IN FATA 
Items Year/Period Unit Pakistan FATA 




Hospitals 1999-2000 Number 876 42 4.8 
Dispensaries -do- -do- 4635 170 3.7 
Maternity & Child Health 
Centre -do- -do- 856 17 2 
Medical Personnel 
Doctors 1999-2000 -do- 91823 408 0.4 
Nurses  -do- -do- 37623 69 0.2 
Lady Health Visitors  -do- -do- 5619 132 2.3 
Beds Strength 
Total Beds -do- -do- 93907 1263 1.3 
Selected Ratios 
Population per Bed 1999-2000 Persons 1495 2645   
Population per Doctor -do- -do- 1529 8189   
Table 7.   Details of Health Facilities in the FATA 
Sources: 
1. Economic Survey 2000-2001. 
2. Directorate of Health Services, FATA, NWFP, Peshawar. 
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APPENDIX N. ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME OF 
FATA FROM 1997 TO 2001 
Sector Details 









Agriculture 30.698 30.308 27.223 24 
Forest 54.402 61.318 66.054 65 
Power 28.5 53.85 38.073 36 
Communication 219 251.79 272.229 291 
Public Health 
Engineering 155.521 89.332 97.527 115 
Housing 18.955 34.806 35.016 20 
Education 181.861 185.541 195.512 214 
Health 107.478 118.279 107.467 159 
Rural 
Development 13.458 33.299 26.456 20 
Research & 
Development 6.039 19.498 11.243 9 
Regional 
Development 37 45 46.221 62 
Total 855 923.021 923.021 1015 
Table 8.   Annual Development Programme of FATA from 1997 to 2001 
Sources: 
1. ADP of FATA issued by Chief FATA, P&D Department, NWFP. 
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APPENDIX O. DETAILS OF AGRICULTURE IN FATA 
Item Year Unit Pakistan FATA FATA as % share of Pakistan 
Farms Total 1990 Number 5075.7 178.1 3.5 
Government Farms -do- -do- 0.2 0.02 10 
Private Farms -do- -do- 5075.5 178 3.5 
Under 1.0 Acre -do- -do- 389.1 26.4 6.8 
1.0 under 2.5 Acres -do- -do- 979.9 46.5 4.7 
2.5 under 5.0 Acres -do- -do- 1043.2 39.1 3.7 
5.0 under 7.5 Acres -do- -do- 839.5 26.1 3.1 
7.5 under 12.5 Acres -do- -do- 857.9 20.9 2.4 
12.5 under 25.0 Acres -do- -do- 619.9 11.6 1.9 
25.0 under 50.0 Acres -do- -do- 237.0 5.2 2.2 
50.0 under 150.0 Acres -do- -do- 93.5 2 2.1 
150.0 and above -do- -do- 15.5 0.2 1.3 
Farms Area Total -do-  Acres 47616.2 1124.4 2.4 
Government Farms 
Area -do- -do- 182.4 0.2 0.1 
Private Farms Area -do- -do- 47433.8 1124.2 2.4 
Table 9.   Details of Agriculture in FATA 
Sources: 
1. Pakistan Census of Agriculture 1990, Preliminary Report. 









EXHIBIT 1 TO APPENDIX O. 
Item Year Unit Pakistan FATA 
FATA as 
% share of 
Pakistan 
Geographical Area 1999-2000 
Million 
Hectares 79.61 2.72 3.4 
Reported Area -do- -do- 59.28 2.72 4.6 
Cultivated Area -do- -do- 21.99 0.18 0.9 
Net Sown Area -do- -do- 16.32 0.17 1 
Current Fallow -do- -do- 5.67 0.02 0.4 
Total Cropped Area -do- -do- 22.76 0.24 1.1 
Uncultivated -do- -do- 36.92 2.53 6.9 
Forest Area -do- -do- 3.66 0.03 0.8 
Culturable Waste -do- -do- 9.13 0.18 2 
Not available for cultivation -do- -do- 24.50 2.32 9.5 
Area sown more than once -do- -do- 6.44 0.7 1.1 
Irrigated -do- -do- 18.09 0.1 0.6 
Table 10.   Details of Land Utilization in FATA 
Sources: 
1. Director Agriculture Statistics, NWFP, Peshawar. 
2. Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan 1999-2000. 
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EXHIBIT 3 TO APPENDIX O. 
Item Year Unit Pakistan FATA 
FATA as % 
Share of 
Pakistan 
Wheat 1999-2000  Tonnes 21079 113.1 0.5 
Rice -do- -do- 5556 17.5 0.3 
Jowar -do- -do- 220 0.5 0.2 
Bajra -do- -do- 156 - - 
Maize -do- -do- 1652 68.3 4.1 
Sugar Cane -do- -do- 46333 79 0.2 
Barley -do- -do- 118 18.2 15.4 
Gram -do- -do- 565 1.6 0.3 
Mustard -do- -do- 297 2.2 0.7 
Sesamum -do- -do- 35 - - 
Cotton -do- -do- 1912 - - 
Tobacco -do- -do- 108 - - 
Fertilizer/off take -do- Tonnes 2832 14.5 0.5 
Table 11.   Production of Major Crops in FATA 
Sources: 
1. Director Agriculture Statistics, NWFP, Peshawar. 
2. Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan 1999-2000. 
3. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government 
of NWFP. 
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APPENDIX P. DETAILS OF LIVESTOCK IN FATA 
1996 Census Figures 
Item Unit Pakistan FATA 
FATA as % 
share of 
Pakistan 
Cattle In millions 20.4 1 4.9 
Buffaloes -do- 20.3 0.1 0.5 
Sheep -do- 23.5 1.4 6 
Goats -do- 41.2 2.2 5.3 
Table 12.   Details of Livestock in FATA 
Sources: 
1. Census of Livestock of NWFP 1996. 
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APPENDIX Q. SUMMARY – FATA DEVELOPMENT WORKS 
Ser  Projects Planned Completed Under Construction 
1 Roads 606 km 435.199 km 171.801 km 
2 Schools 19 15 4 
3 Basic Health Units (BHU) 2 2 - 
4 Water Supply Schemes (WSS) 14 6 8 
5 Tube Wells (TW) 5 3 2 
6 Dug Wells (DW) 12 2 10 
7 Hand Pumps (HP) 128 115 13 
8 Micro Hydal Power Station (MHP) 4 2 2 
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